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White House Electronic Mail and Federal Recordkeeping
Law: Press ''D" To Delete History
James D. Lewis
INTRODUCTION

In the past two decades, the Watergate and Iran-Contra scandals have produced far-reaching inquiries into the activities and decisions of the J;>resident and his White House staff. In both cases,
investigators have tried to determine what the President knew and
when he knew it. 1 The Watergate scandal spawned extensive litigation over the issue of access to presidential materials2 and ultimately led Congress to enact the Presidential Records Act of 1978
(PRA),3 which asserts public ownership of presidential records and
establishes presidential record management procedures.4 The difficulties encountered during investigation of the Iran-Contra affair,s
however, suggest that the PRA fails to ensure the preservation and
availability of historically signifk~t White House materials.
Indeed, the PRA cannot possibly regulate all White House recordkeeping practices, because the statute covers only those
records created or received by the President, the Vice President,
and immediate presidential staff and advisors.6 As a result, if
1. For an account of the Watergate scandal, see CARL BERNSTEIN & BoB WooowARD,
Au. nm PREsrnENT's MEN (1974). A joint report issued by the House and Senate Select

Committees that investigated the Iran-Contra affair provides a detailed factual summary of
that scandal. See H.R. REP. No. 433, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 3-11 (1987). For an examination
of the constitutional dimensions of the Iran-Contra scandal, see HAR.ow H. Kou, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CoNSTITUTION:

SHARING POWER AFrnR TIIE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR

(1990).
2. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). See generally Csrl Bretscher, The President and Judicial Review
Under the Records Acts, 60 GEo. WASH. L. R:Ev. 1477, 1482-83 (1992) (surveying Watergate
litigation).
3. Pub. L No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207
(1988)).
4. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2202-2203 (1988); see also H.R. REP. No. 1487, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5732, 5733 ("The purpose of [the PRA] is (1) to establish the public ownership of records created by future Presidents and their staffs ••• and (2)
to establish procedures governing the preservation and public availability of these records
..•."). See generally Bretscher, supra note 2, at 1481-84 (reviewing the history of ownership
of presidential records).
5. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 433, supra note 1, at xvi ("[M]embers of the [National Security
Council] staff shredded relevant contemporaneous documents in the fall of 1986. Consequently, objective evidence that could have resolved the inconsistencies and overcome the
failures of memory was denied to the Committees - and to history.").
6. See 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2) (1988) (defining "Presidential records"): 44 U.S.C. § 2207
(1988) (subjecting vice-presidential records to the provisions of the PRA); see also infra note
82 and accompanying text.
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National Security Council (NSC) officials improperly destroyed
Iran-Contra materials that they created or received while acting
outside their roles as direct presidential advisors, the PRA would
not apply to such transgressions.7 Unless federal law imposes uniform recordkeeping duties on White House officials regardless of
the presidential or nonpresidential status of particular White House
materials, those officials will be able to evade their recordkeeping
responsibilities by expediently designating records to fit under the
most lenient statutory regim.e.s
Accordingly, because the PRA does not reach beyond presidential records, any attempt to reform White House recordkeeping
must reconcile the PRA with the two additional statutes that bear
upon White House recordkeeping and record disclosure practices:
the Federal Records Act (FRA)9 and the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA). 10 The PRA and the FRA both regulate recordkeeping
practices, but they govern mutually exclusive sets of records: the
FRA covers. records "made or received by an agency of the United
States Govemment," 11 including White House agencies such as the
NSC, while the PRA covers only presidential records, which are
explicitly defined as excluding "official records of an agency. " 12 In
contrast to the recordkeeping focus of the PRA and the FRA, the
FOIA governs public disclosure of agency records13 but sets no re7. See Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 286 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1991} (suggesting that some,
but not all, White House entities create presidential records covered by the PRA and suggesting that the NSC might create both presidential and nonpresidential records}.
8. For example, because the PRA grants an incumbent president great discretion in recordkeeping decisions, see Armstrong, 924 F.2d at 286, the Reagan Administration would
have been motivated to claim, for recordkeeping purposes, that NSC officials were acting as
presidential advisors when creating documents that described Iran-Contra operations, regardless of President Reagan's direct knowledge of those operations. Such documents would
then have been presidential records, .and the President would have been free to dispose of
them. In fact, the Clinton Administration appeared to be taking advantage of this malleable
distinction between presidential and nonpresidential records when it recently asserted that,
contrary to prior practice and to the aforementioned dicta in Armstrong, see supra note 7, the
NSC's "sole role [is] to advise and assist the President," and thus the discretionary features of
the PRA apply to all NSC records. See Douglas Jehl, White House Curbs Access to Security
Council's Data, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 26, 1994, at A6.
Moreover, because White House scandals such as Iran-Contra generally raise the question of presidential knowledge of improper activities, it makes no sense to have the recordkeeping responsibilities of a White House official ·tum on whether that official was
performing presidential or nonpresidential duties; such a distinction would beg a key question in a White House scandal.
9. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2118, 2501-2506, 2901-2909, 3101-3107, 3301-3324 (1988). The FRA
actually consists of several related acts, but this Note adop.ts and expands upon the convention of the district court in Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343, 345 n.2 (D.D.C. 1989),
referring to all such related acts jointly as the Federal Records Act.
10. Pub~L. No. 90-23, 81Stat.54 (1967) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988)).
11. 44 u.s.c. § 3301 (1988).
12. 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2}(B)(i) (1988).
13. ~ U.S.C. § 552(a}(3) (1988}.
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cord.keeping standards.14 Although the FOIA refers only to agency
records, the PRA explicitly provides for eventual public disclosure
of presidential records under the FOIA as wen.1s Because each
statute has a distinct role - the PRA and the FRA governing presidential and agency record.keeping practices and the FOIA controlling public disclosure of White House records - any congressional
or judicial response to the problems presented by the Iran-Contra
scandal must consider the interaction of these federal statutes.
In addition to highlighting this statutory interplay, the Iran-Contra scandal also introduced another novelty not present in Watergate: evidence of White House plans and activities might have been
captured in electronic mail (e-mail) messages exchanged among
White House officials.16 When journalist Scott Armstrong, the National Security Archive, and other private citizens and public interest groups brought suit on the final day of the Reagan Presidency to
prevent destruction of any information still remaining in the White
House e-mail system and on backup computer tapes,17 they faced
not only the typical legal obstacles that block access to presidential
records1s but also the task of convincing a court that e-mail should
be regulated by the same record.keeping and record disclosure laws
that govern more traditional White House documents. 19 Armstrong and his fellow plaintiffs argued that the PRA and the FRA
limit the power of White House officials to dispose of e-mail and
that at least some e-mail retained under the PRA or the FRA
should be available to the public under the FOJA.20
Having twice reached the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the
Armstrong litigation has addressed some basic issues of federal re14. See Armstrong, 721 F. Supp. at 345 ("FOIA ••. is a disclosure statute, and a disclosure
statute only; it imposes no obligations and provides no guidance for the creation or disposal
of particular records.").
15. 44 U.S.C. § 2204(c)(l) (1988).
16. See Armstrong, 721 F. Supp. at 345 n.1; Bretscher, supra note 2, at 1479.
17. Armstrong, 721 F. Supp. at 347; see also Bretscher, supra note 2, at 1479-80.
18. These obstacles include the assertion of executive privilege, see, e.g., United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), lack of private party standing to bring a suit, see, e.g., Kissinger v.
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1980); see also infra note
151, and lack of judicial review of presidential actions, see, e.g., Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d
282, 289-91 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also infra notes 157-61, 190-94 and accompanying text.
19. See Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 810 F. Supp. 335, 340-42 (D.D.C.
1993).
20. 721 F. Supp. at 347. The district court ordered that all computer tapes containing
White House e-mail be preserved pending resolution of the lawsuit. 721 F. Supp. at 348. The
court later held the White House defendants in contempt of court for, among other reasons,
damaging the computer tapes during their transfer to the Archivist on the final days of the
Bush Presidency. Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 821 F. Supp. 761, 768-69
(D.D.C. 1993). This contempt order was, however, vacated by the D.C. Circuit on other
grounds. Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1289-90 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
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cordkeeping law. First, Armstrong v. Bush (Armstrong J)21 considered the availability and extent of judicial review of White House
compliance with the PRA and the FRA. The court concluded that
the FRA permits limited judicial review of White House agency
compliance with recordkeeping law but that the PRA precludes
judicial review of presidential recordkeeping decisions.22 Next,
Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President (Armstrong IJ)23
considered whether the recordkeeping statutes cover electronic
mail. The court affirmed that e-mail is not intrinsically beyond the
reach of federal recordkeeping law24 and that existing White House
agency guidelines for managing e-mail failed to meet FRA
requirements.25
Despite this extensive litigation, Armstrong has left several
White House recordkeeping issues unresolved. Armstrong has not
yet established the right of eventual public access to White House
electronic communications, and the courts have not yet ordered any
FOIA disclosures of Reagan Administration e-mail.26 Nor has the
litigation ensured that similar communications will be preserved in
the future because the Armstrong courts have yet to determine the
necessary features of a White House electronic mail guideline that
would satisfy the dictates of federal recordkeeping law.21 Thus the
21. 924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
22. 924 F.2d at 2'17. In determining the scope of review under the FRA, Armstrong I first
established that courts may review the adequacy of White House agency recordkeeping
guidelines, including NSC guidelines that control the disposition of electronic mail messages.
924 F.2d at 291-94. The court next distinguished between the White House agency staff at
large, whose compliance with recordkeeping guidelines cannot be challenged by private parties, and a select few officials, including the Archivist of the United States and White House
agency heads, who are subject to judicial review because of their special enforcement duties
under the FRA. 924 F.2d at 294-96.
23. 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
24. 1 F.3d at 1282-84.
25. 1 F.3d at 1284-87. On remand, the district court is reviewing the adequacy of new
White House guidelines for the retention of e-mail and is also considering the plaintiffs' request for disclosure of White House e-mail under the FOIA. 1 F.3d at 1296; Armstrong v.
Executive Office of the President, 830 F. Supp. 19, 20 (D.D.C. 1993).
26. Because White House e-mail has yet to be disclosed under the FOIA, the only indications that these mail messages may contain valuable historical information have come from
investigations that have successfully subpoenaed portions of the mail preserved on computer
tapes. See Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 821 F. Supp. 761, 768-69 (D.D.C.
1993) (noting the use of the computer tapes in Iran-Contra investigations and in the investigation of the State Department's search for information about President Clinton during the
1992 presidential campaign). The government's Iran-Contra investigations may indirectly
lead to speedier public disclosure of some White House e-mail; for example, the district court
granted the Armstrong plaintiffs' motion to compel preparation of a so-called Vaughn index,
which itemizes and describes the contents of records being withheld by the government, see
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1973), as a first step toward FOIA disclosure
of e-mail messages already printed out for use in the criminal case against Caspar
Weinberger. Armstrong, 830 F. Supp. at 21, 24.
27. In part as a response to the Armstrong litigation, the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA) recently proposed standards for electronic mail management that
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Armstrong litigation, spanning three presidential administrations
and with no end in sight, demonstrates how federal law has so far
failed to facilitate straightforward judicial evaluation of White
House electronic mail management practices and procedures.
Specifically, the Iran-Contra scandal and the Armstrong litigation reveal three major weaknesses in the current statutory scheme
that governs maintenance of and access to White House computerbased information. First, current law attempts to serve two purposes, a~strative ef:ficiency28 and preservation of a historical
record,29 that may suggest conflicting recordkeeping priorities and
practices. Second, Congress has opted to weaken some enforcement provisions of the recordkeeping statutes in deference to separation of powers concerns that arise whenever Congress or the
courts attempt to regulate or review executive branch activities.30
Finally, current law often fails to resolve the issues raised by the
evolution from paper-based to electronic government communications; for example, the statutes focus on "records," but information
can be electronically represented in various forms that may not be
precisely analogous to records.31 These statutory infirmities cast
doubt upon the congressional claim that under the PRA "the preservation of the historical record of future Presidencies [is]
assured."32
This Note argues that federal recordkeeping law should promote the preservation of history above all other concerns. First,
courts should construe and apply the recordkeeping statutes with
this goal in mind. Second, Congress should amend the recordkeepwould apply to all federal agencies. 59 Fed. Reg. 13,906 (1994) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R.
pt 1234) (proposed Mar. 24, 1994). These standards will be considered infra in section IIl.B.
28. See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 149 (1980)
(citing a Senate report to support the argument that the FRA is meant to facilitate effective
government records management rather than private-party access to those records).
29. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5733
(stating that under the PRA "the preservation of the historical record of future Presidencies
would be assured"); H.R. REP. No. 876, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6267, 6269 (stating that the Freedom of Information Act "guarantees the right
of persons to know about the business of their government").
30. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5737
(noting congressional separation of powers concerns when enacting the PRA); see also Bretscher, supra note 2, at 1495-1508 (discussing separation of powers difficulties in the context of
Armstrong I). The extent to which Congress may permissibly regulate executive branch recordkeeping activities is discussed infra at notes 223-46 and accompanying text.
31. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CoNGRESS, INFORMING nm NATION:
FEDERAL INFORMATION DISSEMINATION IN AN ELECTRONIC AoE 8 (1988) [hereinafter
OTA, INFORMING nm NATION] ("[E]lectronic technology is changing or even eliminating
many distinctions between reports, publications, databases, records, and the like, in ways not
anticipated by existing statutes and policies." (emphasis omitted)); Jamie A. Grodsky, The
Freedom of Information Act in the Electronic Age: The Statute is Not User Friendly, 31
JURIMETRICS J. 17, 17-19 (1990).
32. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5733.
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ing statutes to correct enforcement deficiencies that leave irresponsible recordkeeping practices unchecked and risk the loss of a
historical record of White House decisionmaking. Finally, executive officials should adopt guidelines that identify and preserve historically significant materials regardless of the medium in which
they are captured.
Part I of this Note examines the statutes that currently regulate
the management and public disclosure of White House information
and argues that this existing scheme dictates that the preservation
of history should generally prevail over administrative convenience.
Next, Part II finds that the enforcement mechanisms available
under current recordkeeping law leave the historical record overly
vulnerable to irresponsible government recordkeeping practices
and concludes that Congress can augment the existing enforcement
scheme without offending separation of powers principles. Part III
then argues that the regulatory framework should be applied to
modem means of communication such as electronic mail because
such means are increasingly used to relay historically significant information among government officials. Th.is Note concludes that
the overall recordkeeping regime can and should be reshaped through judicial interpretation, legislative revision, and executive
guidelines - to ensure that White House recordkeeping practices
serve the public interest in historical preservation.
I.

THE EXISTING STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

The current federal statutory framework divides government
information-related responsibilities into two distinct functions regulated by separate and exclusive laws.33 On the one hand, the government must manage information, which includes the creation,
retention, and disposal of records in order to carry out and document government activities; the FRA and the PRA regulate these
information management practices. On the other hand, the government must also disclose information to the public; the FOIA regulates this duty to disclose. Though separate statutes govern these
management and disclosure duties, the duties themselves are
clearly interrelated: a duty to disclose a particular type of information is meaningless without a corresponding duty to retain the information in the first place.34 This relationship between information
33. See Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343, 345 (D.D.C. 1989) (noting the distinction
between the FOIA, which is a disclosure statute, and the FRA and the PRA, which control
the creation, retention, and disposal of records).
34. Reflecting the dual nature of government information responsibilities, the Armstrong
plaintiffs submitted FOIA requests to various White House entities calling for disclosure of
the contents of their e-mail systems and also filed a lawsuit seeking injunctive and declaratory relief based on their claim that the White House had failed to manage e-mail in accordance with the PRA and the FRA. 721 F. Supp. at 347.
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retention and disclosure suggests that weaknesses in one element of
the statutory framework could undermin,e the effectiveness of other
elements. Accordingly, this Part examines the provisions and purposes of the FRA, the PRA, and the FOIA, and it argues that
courts should interpret and reconcile these statutes with the principal goal of ensuring the preservation of a historical record of government activity.

A.

The Federal Records Act

1. The Procedures and Scope of the FRA
The FRA is a series of statutes that govern the creation, management, and disposal of federal records.35 This collection of statutes defines general standards and procedures for record retention
and disposal, requires particular executive officials to develop more
specific guidelines and procedures, and establishes a scheme of administrative oversight to enforce recordkeeping duties.
Under the FRA, the basic unit of government information is the
record. The FRA explicitly defines records as "includ[ing] all
books, papers, maps, photographs, machine readable materials, or
other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics. "36 The FRA dictates that such materials qualify as records
if they serve as "evidence of the organization, functions, policies,
decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government or because of the informational value of data in them."37 By
limiting its coverage to records "made or received by an agency,"38
the FRA regulates only the recordkeeping activities of federal government agencies. Fmally, the FRA provides exclusive procedures
for disposal of records; once a record comes into existence, it may
not be "alienated or destroyed" except in accordance with the
FRA.39
The provisions of the FRA define two key federal recordkeeping roles. First, the head of each agency has several statutory duties, including "mak[ing] and preserv[ing] records containing
adequate and proper documentation of the organization, functions,
policies, decisions, procedures, and essential transactions of the
35. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2118, 2501-2506, 2901-2909, 3101-3107, 3301-3324 (1988); see supra
note 9; see also American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
("[T]hese laws establish a unified system for handling the 'life cycle' of federal records covering their creation, maintenance and use, and eventually their disposal by either destruction· or deposit for preservation.").
36. 44 u.s.c. § 3301 (1988).
37. 44 u.s.c. § 3301 (1988).
38. 44 u.s.c. § 3301 (1988).
39. 44 U.S.C. § 3314 (1988); see also Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 285 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
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agency"40 and "establish[ing] safeguards against the removal or loss
of records he determines to be necessary and required by regulations of the Archivist. ''41 Second, the FRA requires the Archivist
of the United States, a presidential appointee subject to Senate confirmation,42 to "provide guidance and assistance to Federal agencies,"43 to "promulgate standards, procedures, and guidelines with
respect to records management,"44 and to "conduct inspections or .
surveys of the records and the records management programs and
practices within and between Federal agencies."45
The FRA also specifies exclusive procedures for the disposal of
federal records. Both the agency head and the Archivist participate
in the threshold decision whether to preserve a record; records may
only be disposed of if they "do not appear to have sufficient administrative, legal, research, or other value to warrant their further
preservation."46 If an agency believes that certain records warrant
disposal, the agency head must submit a list of those records to the
Archivist.47 If the Archivist agrees that the records need not be
preserved, then the agency may dispose of the records but only "after publication of notice in the Federal Register and an opportunity
for interested persons to submit comment thereon."48 The Archivist may consult with Congress regarding a record disposal decision.
if the Archivist thinks a set of records "may be of special interest to
Congress," or when "consultation with the Congress regarding the
disposal of those particular records is in the public interest."49 Finally, the Archivist may empower an agency to dispose of records
of a specified "form or character" when such records are "common
to several or all agencies"50 or when that agency has previously
been authorized to dispose of such records.51
If records are being disposed of contrary to the provisions of the
FRA, the Archivist and the agency head assume enforcement roles.
If either the Archivist or the agency head learns of "any actual,
impending, or threatened unlawful removal, defacing, alteration, or
40. 44 u.s.c. § 3101 (1988).
41. 44 u.s.c. § 3105 (1988).
42. 44 U.S.C. § 2103(a) (1988).
43. 44 U.S.C. § 2904(a) (1988).
44. 44 U.S.C. § 2904(c)(l) (1988).
45. 44 U.S.C. § 2904(c)(7) (1988).
46. 44 U.S.C. § 3303(2) (1988) (listing the criteria to be applied by the agency head); 44
U.S.C. § 3303a(a) (1988) (listing the criteria to be applied by the Archivist).
47. 44 u.s.c. § 3303 (1988).
48. 44 U.S.C. § 3303a(a) (1988).
49. 44 U.S.C. § 3303a(c) (1988).
50. 44 U.S.C. § 3303a(d) (1988).
51. 44 u.s.c. § 3308 (1988).
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destruction of records,"52 then the one learning of the violation
must notify the other, and the Archivist must "assist the head of the
agency in initiating action through the Attorney General for the
recovery of records unlawfully removed and for other redress provided by law."53 If the agency head fails to pursue an action
through the Attorney General as required, then the Archivist must
ask the Attorney General to initiate the action and must also notify
Congress.54 The FRA specifies only these enforcement roles; it
does not expressly provide a private cause of action to prevent or
redress the unlawful removal or destruction of agency records,55
nor does it explicitly authorize judicial review of the recordkeeping
duties it imposes on the agencies and the Archivist.
2.

The Purposes of the FRA

Given the piecemeal enactment of the various provisions of the
FRA,56 courts have looked to legislative history to identify overriding purposes that might unite the FRA and lead to consistent interpretation.57 Unfortunately, because the legislative history is
fragmented, courts disagree about the relative importance of two
basic yet potentially contradictory FRA purposes. On the one
hand, the FRA may serve primarily to facilitate administrative efficiency in government recordkeeping and may therefore simply be
seen as providing clear-cut criteria and mechanisms for creating and
retaining records that will help the government do its work. On the
other hand, the FRA's main purpose may be to ensure the preservation of a historical record of governmental decisionmaking. In
that case, the FRA would provide standards that emphasize the historical significance of information and safeguards that prevent selfserving record management and disposal -. even if such measures
might hinder administrative efficiency to some extent.
52. 44 U.S.C. § 2905(a) (1988).
53. 44 U.S.C. § 2905(a) (1988) (archivist duties); 44 U.S.C. § 3106 (1988) (agency head
duties). The FRA does not specify the range of actions the Attorney General may pursue
after being notified of the unlawful removal or destruction of records, but the FRA clearly
contemplates that the Attorney General may file a lawsuit. See Kissinger v. Reporters
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 148 (1980) ("[T]he Attorney General may
bring suit to recover the records.").
54. 44 U.S.C. § 2905(a) (1988).
55. See Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 148 (noting that the FRA "establishes only one r~medy for
the improper removal of a 'record' from the agency:" notification of the Attorney General).
The availability of an implied private cause of action alleging FRA violations is considered
infra at notes 154-56, 172-89 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 9.
57. See, e.g., Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 149; American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720
F.2d 29, 55-57 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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In Kissinger v. Reponers Committee for Freedom of the Press, 58
the Supreme Court came down on the side of administrative convenience. The Court found that the FRA's legislative history
"reveals that [its] purpose was not to benefit private parties, but
solely to benefit the agencies themselves and the Federal Government as a whole."59 The Court cited a Senate report stating that
"records come into existence, or should do so, not ... to satisfy the
archival needs of this and future generations, but first of all to serve
the administrative and executive purposes of the organization that
creates them." 60 The FRA provision that requires "the establishment of standards and procedures to assure efficient and effective
records management"61 lends additional support to the analysis in
Kissinger.
Considering the fragmented nature of the FRA, however, the
Kissinger Court's statement of the FR.A's primary purpose should
be limited to the particular facts and FR.A provisions involved in
that case. As the D.C. Circuit pointed out in American Friends Service Committee v. Webster, 62 the Senate report relied upon in Kissinger accompanied the Federal Records Act of 1950,63 but many
key FR.A provisions were enacted separately from the 1950 Act.64
For example, the 1950 Act did not include the FR.A's record disposal provisions, one of which broadly calls upon the Archivist to consider "administrative, legal, research, or other value" in deciding
which records to preserve.65 In addition, the Senate report cited in
Kissinger did not claim that administrative efficiency was the sole
purpose served by the FR.A but rather only the "first interest"
among others.66
58. 445 U.S. 136 (1980).
59. 445 U.S. at 149.
60. 445 U.S. at 149 (quoting S. REP. No. 2140, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950)).
61. 44
§ 2902 (1988).
62. 720 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
63. Federal Records Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-754, § 6, 64 Stat. 578, 583-90 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 40, 41, 44, and 50 U.S.C.).
64. American Friends, 720 F.2d at 53. Armstrong I amplifies this point by noting the
enactment dates of the various parts of the FRA; for example, some disposal provisions were
enacted as part of the 1943 Disposal of Records Act, Pub. L. No. 78-115, 57 Stat. 380 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3314 (1988)), and others were added in the Government Records Disposal Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-287, 84 Stat. 320 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 44 U.S.C.). See Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 284 n.1
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
65. 44 U.S.C. § 3303a(a) (1988). The court in American Friends found it particularly significant that the disposal provisions were not a part of the 1950 Act, because this provided a
way to distinguish the wrongful destruction claim made in American Friends from the wrongful removal claim made in Kissinger. See 720 F.2d at 40, 52.
66. See American Friends, 720 F.2d at 53 (construing S. REP. No. 2140, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1950)). Apart from Kissinger's limited analysis of the FRA's legislative history, that
case also featured two peculiar elements that limit the reach of its reasoning about the FRA's
purposes. Fust, the plaintiffs were seeking to establish an implied cause of action directly

u.s.c.
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Indeed, examination of the entirety of the FRA and its legislative history shows that it is clearly intended to serve the needs of
historical preservation as well as administrative convenience. For
example, the same section of the FRA that speaks of "efficient and
effective records management" also mentions "[a]ccurate and complete documentation of the policies and transactions of the Federal
Government. " 67 In addition, the court in American Friends undertook a thorough study of the legislative history accompanying the
various acts that comprise the FRA, and the court concluded that it
"supports a finding that Congress intended, expected, and positively desired private researchers . . . to have access to the documentary history of the federal government."68
More recent legislation enacted under the umbrella of the FRA
manifests an even greater recognition of the need to preserve historically significant agency information. In the National Archives
and Records Administration Act of 1984,69 Congress transformed
the National Archives and Records Service (NARS) from a branch
of the General Services Administration (GSA) into an independent
agency, designated as the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and headed by the Archivist of the United
States.70 The Act removed the Archivist, the National Archives
that the Archivist manages, and all federal government recordkeeping functions from the control of the GSA,11 based on a congressional determination that the GSA is best suited to perform
"housekeeping functions," as opposed to the "cultural activities" of
the National Archives.12 Congress perceived that "[t]he mission of
under the FRA, see Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 147-48, but the Supreme Court has been increasingly reluctant to imply private causes of action under federal statutes that do not expressly
authorize such suits, see, e.g., Karahalios v. National Fedn. ofFed. Employees Local 1263, 489
U.S. 527, 536 (1989) (observing that the Court has "departed from its prior standard for
resolving a claim urging that an implied statutory cause of action should be recognized"}; see
also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 358 (2d ed. 1994) (finding a trend "for
the Supreme Court to be less willing to create private rights of action"). Next, rather than
alleging widespread or systematic agency violations of the FRA, the Kissinger plaintiffs complained only that the State Department had not done enough to secure the return of the
documents Henry Kissinger had allegedly wrongfully removed when he left the Department.
See 445 U.S. at 148-51. Armstrong I later relied on this aspect of Kissinger to conclude that
private-party claims of individual noncompliance with the FRA's provisions are not judicially
cognizable. See Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 294-95.
67. 44 U.S.C. § 2902 (1988); see also American Friends, 720 F.2d at 42 n.17, 53-55 (listing
various other provisions that show that the FRA serves historical as well as administrative
purposes).
68. 720 F.2d at 55-57.
69. Pub. L. No. 98-497, 98 Stat. 2280 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 44
U.S.C.).
70. 44 U.S.C. § 2102 (1988); S. REP. No. 373, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3865, 3866.
71. S. REP. No. 373, supra note 70, at 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3866.
72. Id. at 6, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3870. The Senate report accompanying the
Act described the GSA mission as "public buildings management and maintenance; federal
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the National Archives - the storage, disposition, preservation, and
use for further Government and private scholarly research of the
records of enduring value of the United States Government ... is fundamentally incompatible with the mission of its parent agency,
GSA."73 By freeing the NARA from GSA control, Congress intended to create .a viable independent agency that could "ensure
that our precious documentary heritage receives the care and attention demanded in a democracy."74
This 1984 legislation clearly demonstrates congressional awareness of the occasional conflict between historical preservation and
administrative expediency, and it also reflects a desire to protect
historical materials from claims of mere convenience. A Senate report accompanying the Act illustrates the dangers of expediency by
recounting and criticizing a series of record management decisions
made during the period of GSA control over the National Archives
that failed to recognize the need to preserve a historical record.75
These incidents led the Senate report to conclude that "[w]ithout
effective 'records management,' the Archivist. comes in after the
fact to a situation where it may be too late to ensure a rich historical
record."76 Seeking to prevent this situation, Congress transferred
control over government record management from an agency that
places highest priority on bureaucratic efficiency to an agency
headed by a historian. In short, this recent legislation demonstrates
that when the competing purposes served by the FRA come into
conflict, the historical record must not be sacrificed for administrative efficiency.
property and services procurement and disposition; transportation; traffic; stockpiling of strategic materials; and management of the Government's data processing systems." Id. at 2,
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3866.
73. Id. at 1-2, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.c.A.N. at 3865-66. The Senate report also quotes
fonner Archivist James Rhoads's elaboration of this point:
The central problem is that many of the objectives, priorities and motivations of
GSA and NARS [the predecessor to NARA] are simply incompatible. There is no way
that an agency dedicated to encouraging scholarly research and other educational and
cultural objectives can function effectively as a subordinate component of a businessoriented conglomerate whose primary responsibilities are for construction and maintenance of public buildings, procurement of supplies, and management of motor pools and
stockpiles of strategic materials.
Id. at 6, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3870.
74. Id. at 23, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3887.
75. Id. at 6-17, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3870-81. For example, the Senate report discusses in detail the 1974 agreement between President Nixon and the head of GSA
that gave the fonner President broad powers to dispose of records created during his administration. Id. at 2, 11-12, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3866, 3875-76. By vesting record
management powers in the head of GSA rather than the Archivist, the then-existing law had
permitted a situation in which "the Archivist had not even been consulted while an arrangement of major impact on our documentary history was worked out" Id. at 3, reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3867.
76. Id. at 21, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3885.
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The Presidential Records Act

1. The Procedures and Scope of the PRA
In contrast to the FRA's regulation of agency recordkeeping,
the PRA77 governs only the recordkeeping practices of the President and members of the presidential staff.78 The PRA provides
general standards and procedures for the retention and disposal of
presidential records, grants the incumbent President broad discretion over day-to-day recordkeeping practices, and establishes a process for eventual public disclosure of the materials a president has
chosen to preserve.
Like the FRA, the PRA establishes a record-based regulatory
scheme. The PRA defines presidential records as "documentary
materials,"79 which are in turn defined as "all books, correspondence, memorandums, documents, papers, pamphlets, works of art,
models, pictures, photographs, plats, maps, films, and motion pictures, including, but not limited to, audio, audiovisual, or other
electronic or mechanical recordations."80 Having established the
broad sweep of documentary materials, the PRA then limits the
scope of presidential records in various ways. Frrst, the definition of
presidential records explicitly excludes "personal records."81 In addition, the PRA covers only records that are "created or received
by the President, his immediate staff, or a unit or individual of the
Executive Office of the President whose function is to advise and
assist the President,'t and such records must have been created or
received "in the course of conducting activities which relate to or
have an effect upon the carrying out of" presidential duties.82 Finally, the statute's plain language shows that the records regulated
under the PRA are mutually exclusive of those regulated under the
FRA; the PRA definition of presidential records explicitly excludes
documentary materials that are "official records of an agency,"83
77. 44 u.s.c. §§ 2201-2207 (1988).
78. See generally Bretscher, supra note 2, at 1481-87 (providing a detailed description of
the background and provisions of the PRA).
79. 44 u.s.c. § 2201(2) (1988).
80. 44 u.s.c. § 2201(1) (1988).
81. 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2)(B)(ii) (1988). The PRA defines personal records as "all documentary materials ... of a purely private or nonpublic character which do not relate to or
have an effect upon the carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties of the President." 44 U.S.C. § 2201(3) (1988). As examples of personal
records, the PRA cites "diaries, journals, or other personal notes ••. which are not prepared
or utilized for, or circulated or communicated in the course of, transacting Government business," 44 U.S.C. § 2201(3)(A) (1988), and "materials relating to private political associations," 44 U.S.C. § 2201(3)(B) (1988).
82. 44 u.s.c. § 2201(2) (1988).
83. 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2)(B)(i) (1988). This section of the PRA cites the definition of
agency provided by the FOIA at 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (1988).
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while the FRA covers only agency records.84 Consequently, the
FRA regulates White House records if they are created or received
by a White House agency, but the PRA controls White House
records created or received by the President or immediate presidential staff as they carry out presidential duties.
The PRA, however, lacks the FRA's executive enforcement
scheme. Specifically, in contrast to the enforcement role dictated
by the FRA, the Archivist plays only an advisory role in record
management decisions made by an incumbent president under the
PRA.85 While in office, a president makes the determination
whether to dispose of records "that no longer have administrative,
historical, informational, or evidentiary value."86 The Archivist
may only offer a written opinion of the proposed disposal87 and, if
desired, request the advice of Congress regarding the proposed disposal. BB Regardless of whether the Archivist approves or disapproves of the President's disposal plans and regardless of whether
the Archivist seeks the advi<;:e of Congress, the President may proceed with a planned disposal, having to wait at most sixty days so
that Congress has a chance to respond.89 The PRA therefore lacks
one of the FRA's key enforcement provisions: the Archivist may
not initiate any sort of legal action against an incumbent president
or presidential staff in order to prevent the improper disposal of
presidential records.9° Finally, just as the FRA does not expressly
provide for judicial review of agency recordkeeping,91 the PRA includes no provision for court oversight of an incumbent president's
recordkeeping decisions,92
Nevertheless, the PRA does provide the Archivist some control
over the records of former presidents. Once a president leaves office, decisionmaking power over that president's records shifts to
the Archivist, who then "assume[s] responsibility for the custody,
control, and preservation of, and access to, the Presidential records
of that President."93 The PRA circumscribes the Archivist's discretion by dictating that public access to certain presidential records be
84. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
85. See Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (describing the differences
in the role of the Archivist under the FRA and the PRA).
86. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(c) (1988).
'({!. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(c)(l) (1988).
88. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(e) (1988).
89. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(c)-(d) (1988).
90. Recall that the FRA requires the Archivist to request that the Attorney General take
action to prevent improper disposal of agency records if the agency head fails to do so. See
supra note 54 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
92. See Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343, 346 (D.D.C. 1989).
93. 44 u.s.c. § 2203(£)(1) (1988).
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restricted even after a president leaves· office.94 The PRA defines
six categories of restricted records, including those with national defense or foreign policy implications, confidential communications
among presidential staff seeking or giving advice, and various files
"the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."95 Just prior to leaving office, a president must specify a term of up to twelve years for each of the six
restricted categories; during these terms, the Archivist must prohibit public access to .the records in each of these categories.96 After consulting with the former President, the Archivist determines
whether records fall into one or more of the restricted categories
and whether the PRA expressly exempts this determination from
judicial review. 97 Once the Archivist decides that a record fits into
one of the restricted categories, that record may not be disclosed
until the term of years specified for that category expires, until the
former President waives the restriction, or until the Archivist determines that the former President has placed the record in the public
domain through publication.98 Under the PRA, then, public access
to presidential records may be delayed, but eventually the public
may invoke the FOIA to gain access to all records that a president
has seen fit to preserve while in office.99
2.

The Purposes of the PRA

In contrast to the piecemeal enactment of the FRA and its attendant conflicting purposes, Congress enacted the PRA as a single
piece of legislation, and its straightforward provisions and legislative history reveal a pair of clearly articulated purposes. First, the
PRA asserts public ownership of presidential records.100 Second,
the PRA evinces a congressional intention that historically significant presidential materials must be preserved, even at the price of
some lost administrative recordkeeping convenience. The PRA directs an incumbent president to consider a record's historical value
94. 44 u.s.c. § 2204 (1988).
95. 44 U.S.C. § 2204(a) (1988).
96. 44 U.S.C. § 2204(a) (1988).
97. 44 U.S.C. § 2204(b)(3) (1988). The PRA is otherwise almost completely silent on
judicial review. The statute does not expressly provide for judicial review of an incumbent
president's recordkeeping decisions, see supra note 92 and accompanying text, but does permit a former president to initiate a suit "asserting that a determination made by the Archivist
violates the former President's rights or privileges," 44 U.S.C. § 2204(e) (1988). Finally, a
court may review an archivist's decision to dispose of a former president's records. See 44
u.s.c. § 2203(f)(3) (1988).
98. 44 u.s.c. § 2204(b)(l) (1988).
99. 44 U.S.C. § 2204(c)(l) (1988).
100. 44 U.S.C. § 2202 (1988); see also H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 2, reprinted In
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5733.
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when making disposal decisions.101 Moreover, the House report accompanying the PRA states that the legislation assures "the preservation of the historical record of future Presidencies"102 and that
one of the main purposes of the PRA is "to establish procedures
governing the preservation and public availability of [presidential]
records. "103 Even when the House report acknowledges the efficiency motive for recordkeeping procedures, it argues for careful
preservation of records, noting that presidential administrations are
sometimes handicapped by lack of availability of records from prior
administrations.104
Furthermore, the legislative history emphasizes that the PRA's
restrictive provisions - those that limit the definition of presidential records and delay public access to those records - should work
to enhance rather than to diminish the historical record. First, Congress indicated that the "personal records" exception to the definition of presidential records is narrow; the House report states that
"a great number of what might ordinarily be construed as one's private activities are, because of the nature of the presidency, considered to be of a public nature."105 Next, the House report explains
that the Archivist, rather than the outgoing President, is given the
power to determine whether records lie within the PRA categories
of delayed public access106 so that an outgoing president may not
arbitrarily invoke these restrictions to thwart the public interest.107
Finally, even while acknowledging the "chilling effect" on free ex101.
102.
103.
104.

44 U.S.C. § 2203(c) (1988).
H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5733.
Id. at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5733.
Id. at 8 n.12, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5739 (citing NATIONAL STUDY
CoMMN. ON RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS OF FED. OFFICIALS, MEMORANDUM OF FINDINGS
ON EXISTING CUSTOM OR LAw, FACT AND OPINION 39 (1977)); see also id. at 4, reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5735 (noting that materials from former presidents to which public
access has been restricted are available to the incumbent President when "necessary to conduct the ongoing business of Government").
105. Id. at 11-12, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5742-43.
106. See supra note 97 and accompanying text; see also H.R. REP. No.1487, supra note 4,
at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5734 (noting that the outgoing President's options are
limited to deciding whether each of the six restrictive categories should be invoked at all and
deciding what terms of years should apply to the chosen restrictive categories).
107. As the House report states:
Some form of statutory access provisions, rather than leaving the choice entirely up
to the former President, was considered necessary to shield the ~rchivist from unnecessary pressure. The Archivist, it was felt, would be susceptible to possible pressure from
the incumbent President to release embarrassing and inappropriate material concerning
a predecessor or rival, and from the predecessor to withhold materials when no sound
policy reason for doing so would be evident The unlimited right to restrict access would
also allow the outgoing President to close availability entirely during a set period; to
permit trusted researchers to view the materials to the exclusion of others; and set
mandatory restrictions which would be akin to assertions of privilege over the materials
against the public.
H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 8-9, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5739-40.
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change among White House staff members that might result from
premature disclosure of presidential records,1os the House report
reveals a clear commitment to the preservation of history, stating
that a great danger of premature disclosure would be "less candid
advice being placed on paper [resulting in] a depleted historical record."109 In short, Congress intended that the PRA should principally serve the needs of historical preservation.
C. The Freedom of Information Act
In contrast to the FRA and the PRA, which dictate record management policies and procedures, the FQJAllO regulates only the
public disclosure of government records.111 Accordingly, the FOIA
defines procedures for disclosure of records and enumerates specific exemptions that the government may invoke to prevent
disclosure.
The FOIA's procedures for disclosure of government information encompass both agency and presidential records. First, like the
FRA,. the FOIA explicitly governs "agency records," 112 although
the FOIA does not define records, 113 and only a 1974 amendment
defines the term agency. 114 Next, the PRA widens the scope of
records available for disclosure through the FOIA by stipulating
that the FOIA governs access to presidential records once the
PRA's restriction period has expired.115
The FOIA specifies the scope of materials that agencies must
make available to the public. Ftrst, the FOIA provides that an
agency must disclose certain basic information, such as a description of its organization and statements of policy, regardless of
whether anyone has requested it.116 Next, the FOIA requires agen108. Id. at 8, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5739.
109. Id. at 14-15, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5746.
110. 5 u.s.c. § 552 (1988).
111. See Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343, 345 (D.D.C. 1989) ("FOIA ••. is a disclosure statute, and a disclosure statute only; it imposes no obligations and provides no guidance
for the creation or disposal of particular records.").
112. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1988) (providing that "each agency, upon any request
for records ..• shall make the records promptly available").
113. See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 183 (1980) (noting that the FOIA does not
define record, and choosing to apply the FRA definition).
114. Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1564 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988)); see
also H.R. REP. No. 876, supra note 29, at 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6274 (discussing the 1974 amendment to the FOIA that explicitly defines agency to include, among other
entities, establishments within the Executive Office of the President).
115. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Without this express PRA provision,
presidential records arguably would be outside the reach of the FOIA, because by statutory
definition presidential records are distinct from agency records. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
116. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l)-(2) (1988).
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cies to make their records available to any person upon request unless one of nine exemptions from disclosure applies.111 Some of
these exemptions are comparable to the restrictions the PRA places
on materials of an outgoing president to delay public access;11s for
example, the PRA and the FOIA share exemptions from disclosure
for materials relating to national defense and for personnel and
medical files. 119 The FOIA exemption from disclosure for "interagency or intra-agency memorandums or letters"120 differs, however, from the PRA restriction covering "confidential communications requesting or submitting advice."121 Whereas courts have
held that the FOIA exemption applies only until the agency decision discussed in the "memorandums or letters" has been made,122
Congress intended the PRA restriction to apply throughout the period of restriction specified by the outgoing President.123 The
FOIA exemptions also differ from the PRA restrictions in a more
fundamental way. The PRA restrictions leave no room for discretion, but they only delay public access.1 24 In contrast, the FOIA
gives agencies discretion to decide whether to invoke exemptions,125 but it places no limit on the length of time exempt materials may be withheld from the public.126
By submitting FOIA requests for disclosure of government information, private individuals "enforce" the FOIA; the statute provides no executive enforcement scheme. In addition, the FOIA
explicitly provides for judicial review: courts may review an
agency's decision not to comply with a FOIA request,127 and they
may also review an agency's failure to respond to a FOIA request
in a timely fashion.128
The legislative history of an amendment to the FOIA clearly
expresses the FOIA's purpose: guaranteeing "the right of persons
117. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1988); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988).
118. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
119. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l) (1988) (FOIA national defense exemption) and 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1988) (FOIA personnel and medical file exemption) with 44 U.S.C.
§ 2204(a)(l) (1988) (PRA national defense restriction) and 44 U.S.C. § 2204(a)(6) (1988)
(PRA personnel and medical file restriction).
120. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(5) (1988).
121. 44 U.S.C. § 2204(a)(5) (1988).
122. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 421U.S.132, 150-54 (1975) (distinguishing
between predecisional and postdecisional agency documents); Access Reports v. Department
of Justice, 926 F.2d 1192, 1194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (surveying judicial interpretations of the
"deliberative process" exemption).
123. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5745.
124. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
125. See Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 678 F.2d 315, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
126. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b) (1988).
127. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4){B) (1988).
128. See 5 U.S.C. § 552{a)(6)(C) {1988).
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to know about the business of their government."129 Many provisions of the FOIA support this goal. First, in court proceedings that
follow an agency's denial of a FOIA request, the agency bears the
burden of proving that one of the exemptions applies.130 Next, the
FOIA imposes strict limits on the amount of time agencies have to
respond to requests.131 In addition, the FOIA explicitly limits the
reasons for withholding information to the statute's nine exemptions.132 The FOIA therefore stands for the ideal that free flow of
information from the government to the citizenry is crucial to a
well-functioning democracy.133

D. Reconciling the Purposes of Recordkeeping and Record
Disclosure Law

The three statutes examined in this Part were enacted separately, and they arguably reflect different congressional concerns
and priorities. Moreover, the FR.A alone consists of distinct enactments that seem to serve conflicting purposes.134 Although this
Part has thus far argued that the language, structure, and history of
each individual statute evince a congressional intent to emphasize
the preservation of historical records, this section argues in addition
that courts should read these statutes together and thereby interpret federal recordkeeping law as a unified whole that mandates the
preservation of a historical record of government policymaking.
Several arguments support judicial reference to the broad historical preservation mandate of the PRA as a way of helping to
reconcile the conflicting purposes of the FRA. First, courts sometimes resolve statutory ambiguities by consulting related statutes
that provide straightforward solutions to the problem at hand;13s
129. H.R. REP. No. fr76, supra note 29, at 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6269.
130. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988).
131. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) (1988).
132. 5 U.S.C. § 552(d) (1988).
133. The House and Senate Select Committees that investigated the Iran-Contra affair
echoed this ideal in their joint report:
Officials who make public policy must be accountable to the public. But the public
cannot hold officials accountable for policies of which the public is unaware. Policies
that are known can be subjected to the test of reason, and mistakes can be corrected
after consultation with the Congress and deliberation within the Executive branch itself.
Policies that are secret become the private preserve of the few, mistakes are inevitably
perpetuated, and the public loses control over Government. That is what happened in
the Iran-Contra Affair ••.•
H.R. REP. No. 433, supra note 1, at 16. Compare New York Tunes Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 720-24 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring), in which Justice Douglas, arguing that publication of the Pentagon Papers should not be enjoined, stated: "Secrecy in government is
fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors. Open debate and discussion of public issues are vital to our national health." 403 U.S. at 724.
134. See supra notes 56-76 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 183 (1980) (looking to the FRA definition
of records to resolve the ambiguity left by the FOIA's failure to define agency records). See
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clearly the PRA and the FRA concern the same subject matter,
federal recordkeeping. Second, because the PRA was enacted
more recently than most of the FRA's provisions, it can be seen as
part of an evolving congressional recognition that administrative efficiency must ultimately yield to the preservation of government
history.136 Accordingly, some of the older legislative history of the
FRA that places greater emphasis on achp.inistrative convenience
can perhaps be given less weight because it is based on outdated
congressional concerns.
Additionally, interpreting the FRA to require a lesser historical
preservation burden than that imposed by the PRA leads to the
anomalous result that two distinct recordkeeping mandates apply
within the White House itself - depending on whether a given record is presidential or is instead traceable to an agency.131 Such a
result would be needlessly confusing, particularly because the language of the two statutes is similar enough to support a unified
mandate.138 Moreover, this result would imply that presidential
staff must be held to a stricter standard of preservation than that
required of agency officials, based solely on a clearer congressional
statement of the supremacy of the goal of historical preservation in
the PRA's legislative history.139 But a claim that presidential
records have greater historical significance than agency records ignores substantial public interest in the roles agencies might have
played at key moments in the nation's history.140 Finally, given the
generally 2A NoRMAN J. SINGER, SuntERLAND STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION §§ 51.01-03 (4th
ed. 1984) (describing the general rules for construing related statutes).
136. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text (describing the trend toward preservation of history in more recent FRA legislation); cf. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commn., 626 F.2d 1020, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding that a "latter law"
implicitly restricts an inconsistent earlier statute); 2A SINGER, supra note 135, § 51.02 ("If
there is an irreconcilable conflict between the new provision and the prior statutes, the new
provision will control as it is the later expression of the legislature.").
137. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (noting that the FRA governs some
White House recordkeeping practices while the PRA controls others).
138. Compare supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (describing the FRA definition
of records) with supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (describing the PRA definition).
Indeed, the House report accompanying the PRA explicitly states an intention that the PRA
and the FRA be uniformly applied: "[I]t was felt important that once having declared the
President's papers to be Government records, they be governed to the extent feasible by the
same statutory standards controlling Cabinet members' records and all other Government
records. Consistency in application of the rules seemed critical." H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra
note 4, at 8, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5739.
139. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text
140. See, e.g., American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 54 n.44 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (noting congressional interest in FBI records that might be relevant to assassination
investigations).
Furthermore, the facts surrounding the Armstrong litigation refute any claim that agency
records should be subject to a lesser standard of preservation than presidential records, because a major question in the Iran-Contra affair was whether questionable policies were formulated by agency officials or by the President himself. See Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp.
343, 345 n.1 (D.D.C. 1989). Indeed, regardless of what the President knew about the extent
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unique separation of powers issues raised by legislation that regulates presidential activities,141 Congress could hardly have intended
that the President should meet a higher or more burdensome recordkeeping standard than federal agencies. In short, many arguments support interpreting the FRA in light of the PRA's broad
mandate to preserve historical materials, particularly in cases in
which White House recordkeeping responsibilities are at issue.
In addition to clarifying the FRA, there are other reasons courts
should examine the FRA, the PRA, and the FOIA together to arrive at a unified and coherent statement of federal recordkeeping
policy under current law. For example, courts can apply a key principle of the FOIA - namely, public disclosure of records pertaining to government decisionmaking142 - to impose a duty that the
government retain at least some records that will eventually be subject to disclosure under the FOIA.143 Courts can also resolve any
conflicts based upon differing qr nonexistent definitions of records
by considering the broad purposes served by all three statutes
viewed as a whole.144 A global strategy for interpreting federal recordkeeping and record disclosure law would thus ensure more
consistent treatment of records, whether agency or presidential, and
would also ensure that courts apply only standards chosen by Conof the NSC's Iran-Contra activities, historians and the public would certainly want to learn
about those activities at some point. Cf. KoH, supra note 1, at 53-57 {describing the NSC's
increasing role in policymaking, which culminated in that agency's pivotal role in the IranContra scandal). Notwithstanding this equal importance of presidential and agency records,
however, the Armstrong courts have not yet used the PRA's clearer statement of purposes as
an aid to construction of the FRA.
141. See Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 292 (D.C. Cir. 1991) {distinguishing the FRA
from the PRA by noting that "[i]n drafting the FRA, Congress did not have to worry about
the stark separation of powers questions implicated by legislation regulating the conduct of
the President's daily operations"). Separation of powers concerns are also discussed infra in
notes 223-46 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
143. Justice Brennan suggested this approach in Kissinger:
If FOIA is to be more than a dead letter, it must necessarily incorporate some restraint
upon the agency's power to move documents beyond the reach of the FOIA requester.
Even the Court's opinion implies - as I think it must - that an agency would be improperly withholding documents if it failed to take steps to recover papers removed from
its custody deliberately to evade an FOIA request. Beyond that minimal rule, I would
think it also plainly unacceptable for an agency to devise a records routing system aimed
at frustrating FOIA requests in general by moving documents outside agency custody
with unseemly haste.
Indeed, I would go further. If the purpose of FOIA is to provide public access to the
records incorporated into Government decisionmaking, then agencies may well have a
concomitant responsibility to retain possession of, or control over, those records.
Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 159 {1980) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted); see also Kissinger, 445 U.S. at
161-65 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explicitly adopting this approach); American Friends, 720 F.2d at 42 n.16 (construing Justice Brennan's opinion in
Kissinger).
144. See infra notes 249-72 and accompanying text (arguing that despite differences in
language, all three statutes support a functional definition of records).
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gress, regardless of which particular statute enunciates the
standard.145
II.

ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL RECORDKEEPING LAW

As Part I demonstrated, the FRA, the PRA, and the FOIA together create a complex statutory scheme for regulating federal
government information management and disclosure. Because the
government cannot disclose information it has not retained, its recordkeeping and record disclosure duties are clearly intertwined;
nonetheless, separate statutes control these related responsibilities.146 Similarly, even though White House agency and presidential
staff may share communications facilities, recordkeeping systems,
and a common mission of presidential policymaking, the federal
statutory scheme distinguishes between agency and presidential
records within the White House.147 Given this complex scheme, it
is no simple matter to ensure White House compliance with recordkeeping law or even to determine the precise contours of White
House recordkeeping responsibilities.
This Part examines the enforcement of White House recordkeeping responsibilities. First, this Part considers the extent to
which private parties may bring suit alleging that the government
has failed to meet its recordkeeping responsibilities.148 In particular, because neither the PRA nor the FRA explicitly provide for
145. Of course, Congress could also address this problem by enacting unified recordkeeping legislation that eliminates the distinction between agency and presidential records, and by
explicitly reconciling the duties under this unified legislation with government record disclosure responsibilities under the FOIA. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Electronic Records Management and Archives, 53 U. Pm. L REv. 963, 995 (1992) ("The absence of explicit linkage
between the FOIA and records statutes creates problems for sound records management.").
It must be conceded that the unified approach described in the text would not have substantially changed the results thus far in the Armstrong litigation. First, the court in Armstrong I found a limited power of judicial review of FRA duties without needing to appeal to
the agency's ultimate duty to disclose information. See 924 F.2d at 291-96. In addition,
although the court found no power to review individual compliance with the FRA, see 924
F .2d at 294-95, no language in either the PRA or the FOIA clearly supports a different result.
Next, a court could not plausibly carry over the implied power of judicial review from the
FRA to the PRA, especially in light of the clear and intentional differences between the FRA
and the PRA. See infra note 161 and accompanying text. Fmally, it would do little good to
review the Archivist's actions with respect to an incumbent president, because the PRA explicitly limits the Archivist to an advisory rather than an enforcement role in the President's
recordkeeping decisions. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text. As the Armstrong
litigation moves to scrutiny of White House recordkeeping guidelines, however, a unified
approach may aid evaluation of those guidelines. See infra section III.B (proposing guidelines for management of White House electronic mail).
146. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
148. Because the FOIA explicitly provides for judicial review of agency refusals to disclose information, see supra note 127 and accompanying text, this Part considers only judicial
review of government recordkeeping pursuant to the FRA and the PRA.
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judicial review by way of private suit,149 a court must decide
whether, and to what extent, either of those statutes permit such
review by implication. Section II.A surveys cases that have considered the availability and extent of judicial review of PRA and FRA
compliance and finds that court rulings have generally reflected the
statutory scheme's sharp distinction between agency and presidential records - namely, courts have found that agency recordkeeping practices are reviewable but presidential practices are not.
Section II.B then argues that Congress should amend recordkeeping law to provide more comprehensive enforcement roles and judicial review. The existing combination of severely limited judicial
review and the PRA's broad grant of discretion to the incumbent
presidential staff to decide which records to retain1so leaves historically valuable presidential materials acutely vulnerable to irresponsible recordkeeping in contravention of the mandate established by
federal recordkeeping law. This Part concludes that Congress can
address these problems without offending separation of powers
principles.

A. The Private Right To Seek Judicial Enforcement of
Recordkeeping Duties
A court that is presented with a private-party claim of government recordkeeping violations must address two issues. First and
foremost, given that Congress did not expressly empower courts to
review government compliance with the terms of the PRA or the
FRA, a court must determine whether Congress nonetheless intended that judicial review be available. Assuming such a congressional intention exists, the court must then decide which particular
statutory provisions give rise to reviewable duties.1s1 This section
149. See supra notes 55, 92 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
151. The court must also determine whether the private plaintiff has standing to cha!·
lenge government recordkeeping practices. Both American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster,
720 F.2d 29, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983), and Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1991),
hold that private researchers and historians satisfy the "zone of interests" standing test. This
test requires a court to "discern whether the interest asserted by a party in the particular
instance is one intended by Congress to be protected or regulated by the statute under which
the suit is brought." Control Data Corp. v. Baldrige, 655 F.2d 283, 293-94 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
see also American Friends, 720 F.2d at 49-52 (reviewing the history and content of the "zone
of interests" test).
The American Friends court found that both the language and the legislative history of
the FRA show a clear congressional intent to benefit researchers and historians by preserving
a documentary history of government. 720 F.2d at 53-57. For example, the court cited both
the FRA provision that calls for consideration of a record's research value prior to its disposal, 720 F.2d at 53-54 (citing 44 U.S.C. § 3303a(a) (1988)), and a statement in the FRA's
legislative history that a 1978 amendment was intended to simplify researcher access to government records, 720 F.2d at 56 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1522, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2288, 2289). Fmally, the court supported its holding that researchers have standing to challenge improper record disposals by observing "the simple,
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considers the viability of judicial enforcement of recordkeeping law
at the behest of private parties by surveying cases that have determined the availability and extent of judicial review of recordkeeping duties.
In particular, the Armstrong decisions have established the precise scope of judicial review under the FRA and the PRA. Courts
may consider whether agency recordkeeping guidelines and directives meet the mandate of the FRA. In addition, although courts
may not entertain private-party actions alleging that an individual
agency official is violating recordkeeping guidelines, they may review the failure of the Archivist or an agency head to initiate an
enforcement action against such an agency official. Finally,
although the PRA generally precludes judicial review of presidential recordkeeping practices, a court may review whether White
House guidelines properly classify records as presidential.

1. The Lack of a Private Cause of Action Under the PRA and
the FRA

Neither the FRA nor the PRA explicitly allows a private plaintiff to seek judicial review of government recordkeeping practices.152 Furthermore, although courts may find an implied power
of review based on congressional intent,153 the courts have found
that neither the FRA nor the PRA evinces an intent to permit private suits. First, in Kissinger v. Reponers Committee for Freedom of
practical fact that government records can only be accepted by the Archives, where they may
be made available to the public, if the agency that creates them has not destroyed them first."
720 F.2d at 55.
Perhaps because the PRA explicitly calls for consideration of a presidential record's historical value prior to its disposal, 44 U.S.C. § 2203(c) (1988), the Armstrong I court had no
trouble extending the result in American Friends to cover both the FRA and the PRA. Annstrong I, 924 F.2d at 287-88. The government argued that American Friends had only established that private researchers and historians were within the "zone of interests" of the
FRA's disposal provisions, not its record management provisions. 924 F.2d at 288. The court,
however, found such a distinction untenable; whether an agency official deletes an e-mail
message because he disregards the FRA's disposal provisions or because he believes it fails
to qualify as a record, his action results in a message "lost forever to history." 924 F.2d at
288. The court concluded that private researchers and historians have standing to challenge
an alleged failure to comply with either PRA or FRA recordkeeping provisions. 924 F.2d at
288.
Taken together, these decisions on the issue of standing clearly show that one of the
purposes of both the PRA and the FRA is "to ensure that private researchers and historians
••• have access to the documentary history of the federal government." Armstrong I, 924
F.2d at 287. These rulings therefore support the claim that federal recordkeeping law should
principally serve the needs of history. See supra section I.D.
152. Recall that the FRA authorizes the Attorney General to bring an action to prevent
the wrongful destruction of records. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. This
section of this Note is concerned only with private causes of action.
153. See generally Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979)
(discussing the factors to be considered when determining whether Congress intended judicial review to be available under a statute).
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the Press, 154 the Supreme Court declined to imply a private right of
action from the terms and legislative history of the FRA,155 Because the FRA provides only administrative enforcement mechanisms and because the Court interpreted the FRA's legislative
history to support a congressional preference for administrative
mechanisms, Kissinger concluded that the FRA does not demonstrate the requisite congressional intent to permit judicial review.156
In Armstrong 1, 151 the D.C. Circuit similarly concluded that the
PRA does not provide an implied private cause of action to review
presidential recordkeeping.15s Ironically, the court relied on the
absence of administrative enforcement mechanisms in the PRA to
conclude that Congress did not intend to permit judicial review of
presidential recordkeeping practices or decisions, 159 The court
noted that the PRA grants the incumbent President great discretion
in making record disposal decisions160 and saw this discretion as an
indication of congressional concern that extensive oversight of presidential recordkeeping - whether by the Archivist, Congress, or
the courts - would unduly encroach upon the President's day-today operations, thereby upsetting the balance of power ·among
branches of govemment.161 Thus Kissinger and Armstrong I fore-close the possibility of judicial review implied directly from the
terms of either the FRA or the PRA.
2.

The Availability and Extent of Judicial Review Under the APA

Despite the absence of an express or implied cause of action
under the FRA or the PRA, limited judicial review is nonetheless
available to a private plaintiff under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA).162 The APA provides for judicial review of the action
of an administrative agency unless a statute clearly precludes such
154. 445 U.S. 136 {1980).
155. 445 U.S. at 148-50.
156. 445 U.S. at 147-50. The Court reasoned that "regardless of whether Kissinger has
violated the [FRA], Congress has not vested federal courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate
that question upon suit by a private party. That responsibility is vested in the administrative
authorities." 445 U.S. at 149-50.
157. Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
158. 924 F.2d at 291.
159. 924 F.2d at 290-91.
160. 924 F.2d at 290; see also supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
161. 924 F.2d at 290-91 ("Congress was ... keenly aware of the separation of powers
concerns that were implicated by legislation regulating the conduct of the President's daily
operations.").
162. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 3105, 3344 (1988). The Kissinger Court explicitly left
open the possibility of review under the APA: "We need not decide what remedies might be
available to private plaintiffs complaining that the administrators and the Attorney General
have breached a duty to enforce the [FRA], since no such action was brought here." Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 150 n5 (1980).
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review or the action is left to the agency's discretion.163 Moreover,
the APA generally creates a presumption in favor of the availability
of judicial review of agency actions, even if the statute that defines
agency duties is silent on the subject of court review.164 Accordingly, in American Friends Service Committee v. Webster,165 the
D.C. Circuit held that the APA did indeed permit judicial review of
the compliance of the FBI and the National Archives and Records
Service (NARS)166 with the record disposal provisions of the
FRA.167 The court found that record disposal issues are appropriate for judicial review, in part because the FRA provides specific
criteria for record retention that agencies and the NARS are bound
to follow. 168 The American Friends court also offered a pragmatic
argument in favor of judicial review, reasoning that judicial oversight would counteract the tendency of agencies to exercise their
"built-in incentive to dispose of records relating to 'mistakes.' " 169
163. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1988) (prohibiting judicial review where "statutes preclude
judicial review" or where "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law"); 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (1988) ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof."}; see also Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343, 349 (D.D.C. 1989} (considering the availability of judicial review under the APA when no private cause of action can be
implied directly from the PRA or the FRA); Bretscher, supra note 2, at 1491-93 (discussing
judicial review under the APA).
164. See Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (holding that "only upon a
showing of 'clear and convincing' evidence of a contrary legislative intent should courts restrict access to judicial review"). But see Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-33 (1985)
(finding that judicial review is presumptively unavailable in the context of an agency refusal
to take enforcement action).
165. 720 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
166. At the time of American Friends, the NARS was still a component of the General
Services Administration (GSA}. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text. Because the
NARS was part of a federal agency (the GSA}, its actions were potentially subject to judicial
review under the APA. 720 F.2d at 38-45.
167. 720 F.2d at 38-45. The fact situations in American Friends and in Armstrong are
similar. The American Friends plaintiffs claimed that the FBI and the NARS had failed to
carry out their statutory duties to manage and properly dispose of records. 720 F.2d at 35.
Protracted litigation followed, resulting in the FBI and the NARS developing new record
retention plans and disposal schedules. 720 F.2d at 35-36.
168. 720 F.2d at 42-43, 45. The court reconciled its holding with Kissinger's refusal to
permit judicial review by noting that Kissinger explicitly leaves unanswered the question of
judicial review under the APA and by distinguishing Kissinger's allegations of improper removal of records from allegations that the agencies were destroying records in violation of
the FRA. 720 F.2d at 40-41. The court also found that judicial oversight would not undermine the ability of the FBI and the NARS to carry out their core functions and that the
congressional oversight role provided by the FRA was an inadequate substitute for judicial
review. 720 F.2d at 44-45.
169. 720 F.2d at 41. The court emphasized the self-policing difficulty that would result if
judicial review were not available:
In a situation where GSA and the FBI (part of the Justice Department) are the allegedly
guilty parties that have agreed to the destruction of the records, it is highly unlikely that
Congress intended the exclusive remedy to be a Justice Department suit to recover the
records (and to have the remedy triggered by FBI or GSA notification of improper
records removal).
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Having determined that the APA authorizes judicial review of
agency and archivist compliance with the FRA, a court must next
decide precisely which agency and archivist duties are subject to
review.17° Broadly speaking, the FRA defines three recordkeeping
roles.171 First, each individual agency official must comply with recordkeeping law and agency guidelines. Next, if an individual fails
to comply, the agency head and the Archivist assume special enforcement roles. Fmally, the agencies and the Archivist must work
together to formulate recordkeeping guidelines.
In Armstrong 1, 112 the D.C. Circuit held that the individual recordkeeping role is not subject to judicial review under the APA.173
Despite the FRA's explicit command that no agency records may
be "alienated or destroyed" except in accordance with its provisions,174 the court invoked Kissinger's reasoning11s to find that Congress did not intend to supplement the FRA's administrative
enforcement mechanisms with private suits.176 Instead, the court
concluded that Congress left the task of ensuring individual compliance with agency recordkeeping guidelines to the Archivist and the
agency head.111
720 F.2.d at 41. Congress addressed this FRA weakness in a 1984 amendment that requires
the Archivist to request the Attorney General to initiate an action to prevent wrongful removal of records when an agency head fails to do so. 44 U.S.C. § 2905(a) {1988). In the
legislative history of this amendment, Congress noted "the anomalous situation created by
current [pre-1984] law whereby an agency head has a duty to initiate action to recover
records which he himself has removed." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1124, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 28
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3894, 3903; see also Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282,
292 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (rejecting the government's argument that the 1984 FRA amendments
showed congressional intent to preclude judicial review by opting instead to strengthen administrative enforcement mechanisms).
170. The APA provides two mechanisms for shielding particular agency actions from review. First, an agency can overcome the general presumption that judicial review of an
agency action is available by showing that Congress intended to preclude such review; such a
showing typically involves a claim that the statutory scheme governing the agency action
leaves no room for judicial oversight. See American Friends, 720 F.2d at 39. Second, because
the APA states that courts may not review actions that are "committed to agency discretion
by law," 5 U.S.C. § 70l{a){2) {1988) courts determining the extent of judicial review must
find that an agency's duties are defined with sufficient precision to permit a judgment on
whether the agency properly carried out those duties. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,
830 {1985) (construing APA§ 701(a)(2) and finding that "even where Congress has not affirmatively precluded review, review is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court
would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion"); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) {formulating the "law to apply" test, under which judicial review of an agency action is unavailable
where a statute only broadly defines the agency's role).
171. See supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text (describing the duties the FRA imposes on individuals, agencies, and the Archivist).
172. Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
173. 924 F.2d at 294-95.
174. 44 u.s.c. § 3314 {1988).
175. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
176. 924 F.2d at 294-95.
177. 924 F.2d at 294.
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In contrast, Armstrong I holds that courts may consider whether
the Archivist and agency heads have properly performed their FRA
enforcement duties.178 Having just found that record destruction
by individuals can only be halted by the Archivist and the agency
head acting in their enforcement roles, the Armstrong I court recognized that judicial review constitutes the last line of defense in the
event that neither the Archivist nor the agency head takes enforcement action.11 9 Moreover, because the FRA includes provisions
that require the Archivist and the agency head to take enforcement
steps,18o the court reasoned that initiation of an enforcement action
involves no exercise of discretion by the Archivist or the agency
head.181 The court concluded that the APA permits judicial review
of the enforcement roles defined by the FRA.182
Next, the D.C. Circuit ruled in Armstrong I that courts may consider whether agency recordkeeping guidelines and directives meet
the mandate of the FRA.183 Contrasting the PRA's "stark separation of powers questions" - and the resulting congressional intent
"to minimize outside interference with the President's recordkeeping practices" - with the FRA's "more detailed and comprehensive agency recordkeeping provisions," 184 the court found that
Congress did not intend to preclude review of the adequacy of an
agency's recordkeeping guidelines.185 Instead, the court held that
"the FRA reflects a congressional intent to ensure that agencies adequately document their policies and decisions"186 and that judicial
review of guidelines would not frustrate this intent.187 The court
also determined that development of recordkeeping guidelines is
not left to agency discretion; just as the FRA defines clear enforcement duties, the statute also specifically requires each agency head
to develop recordkeeping guidelines and procedures in cooperation
with the Archivist.188 Finally, the court found that the FRA's de178. 924 F.2d at 296.
179. 924 F.2d at 295. The need for judicial review is underscored by the fact that neither
an archivist nor an agency head has ever invoked the FRA's provisions that require the
initiation of action through the Attorney General if necessary to block improper destruction
of records. Moreover, the court's pragmatic assessment of the dire consequences of a complete lack of judicial review of the FRA's enforcement roles evokes Justice Brennan's similar
concern with Kissinger's conclusion that judicial review of improper record removal cannot
be implied from either the FRA or the FOIA. See supra note 143.
180. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
181. 924 F.2d at 295-96.
182. 924 F.2d at 296.
183. 924 F.2d at 291-94.
184. 924 F.2d at 292.
185. 924 F.2d at 292-93.
186. 924 F.2d at 292.
187. 924 F.2d at 292-93.
188. 924 F.2d at 293.
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tailed specification of the types of records agencies must retain enables courts to evaluate the adequacy of agency recordkeeping
guidelines and directives.1s9
Turning to the PRA, however, the Armstrong I court ruled that
the APA does not provide a mechanism for judicial review of presidential recordkeeping practices.190 Because the APA only authorizes review of agency actions,191 the court first had to consider
whether the President could be considered an agency. The court
recognized that the APA does not explicitly exclude the President
from its definition of agency and that some earlier cases had suggested in dicta that the President is an agency. 192 The court nevertheless concluded that congressional silence on the issue, as
demonstrated in the APA's language and legislative history, should
not be construed as granting power to review presidential actions,
particularly given the separation of powers issues such review might
raise.193 Consequently, Armstrong I found that the APA does not
empower courts to review presidential compliance with the PRA.194
Finally, in Armstrong II, 19s the D.C. Circuit allowed very limited
review of presidential recordkeeping. The court's ruling in Armstrong I had raised a troubling question: If White House agencies
such as the NSC are subject to review but the President is not,196
189. 924 F.2d at 293-94.
190. 924 F.2d at 288-89.
191. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(l) (1988) (defining agency for purposes of judicial review).
192. 924 F.2d at 288-89; see also Bretscher, supra note 2, at 1492-93 (discussing cases that
consider whether the President is an agency for purposes of review under the APA).
193. 924 F.2d at 288-89; see also Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2775 (1992)
(holding that the President is not an agency under the APA).
194. 924 F.2d at 289.
195. Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
196. It is unclear exactly which White House entities count as agencies under recordkeeping law. Recall that the FOIA explicitly defines the term agency to include White House
entities, including establishments within the Executive Office of the President. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(t) (1988); see also supra note 114 (discussing this provision of the FOIA and its legislative history); cf. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 155-56
(1980) (holding that notes of Kissinger's telephone conversations while he was serving as a
presidential advisor are not subject to disclosure under the FOIA because the Office of the
President is separate from the Executive Office of the President and thus is not included
within the FOIA definition of agency); Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding that the Task Force on Regulatory Relief, which was created by the President, headed by
the Vice President, and composed of various cabinet members, was not an agency for purposes of the FOIA). In addition, the PRA explicitly incorporates the FOIA definition of an
agency when excluding "official records of an agency" from its definition of presidential
records. 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2)(B) (1988); see also supra note 83 and accompanying text. The
Armstrong I court clarified the distinction between White House records subject to the PRA
and those subject to the FRA:
Because the various components of the Executive Office of the President ("EOP") perform different functions, they create different kinds of records. The President, the Office
of Vice President, and the components of the EOP whose sole responsibility is to advise
the President are subject to the PRA and create "presidential records." The components of the EOP that have statutory responsibility (such as the Office of Management
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what would prevent an across-the-board, unreviewable presidential
declaration that all White House information is properly viewed as
presidential rather than as agency records?197 In order to escape
this dilemma, the Armstrong II court found that the PRA permits a
limited form of review: "[C]ourts may review guidelines outlining
what is, and what is not, a 'presidential record' to ensure that
materials that are not subject to the PRA are not treated as presidential records. "19s
B. Improving Enforcement of Recordkeeping Law
The enforcement scheme established under existing federal recordkeeping law has proved inadequate. Particularly in the area of
presidential records, the existing mechanisms for administrative and
judicial oversight of government recordkeeping practices and procedures cannot protect historically significant materials from arbitrary, careless, or reckless recordkeeping decisions. Accordingly,
this section suggests that Congress should amend the recordkeeping
statutes both to grant the Archivist a more comprehensive enforcement role and to provide explicitly for limited judicial oversight.
This section also argues that Congress would not violate separation
of powers principles by adding an enforcement scheme to the PRA.

1. Weaknesses in the Existing Enforcement Scheme
The events leading to the Armstrong litigation demonstrate the
problems that result from the inadequate enforcement scheme
under current recordkeeping law. Over a period of several years,
the Archivist remained idle while the Executive Office of the Presiand Budget and Council on Environmental Quality) are subject to the FRA and create
"federal records." Because NSC advises the President and has statutory obligations, it
creates both presidential and federal records.
924 F.2d at 286 n.2; see also Bretscher, supra note 2, at 1487-88 ("The intersection of the
PRA and the FRA within the White House is defined by the nature of the record in question
and the character of the White House office responsible for the record.").
197. See Bretscher, supra note 2, ~t 1506-08 (noting the PRA-FRA line drawing problem
raised by the Armstrong I decision and anticipating Armstrong Il's solution to this problem).
This problem is particularly evident in the case of White House entities such as the NSC that
can create both presidential and federal records. Of course, the Clinton Administration has
shown that this is no mere hypothetical issue by declaring that all NSC records count as
presidential records. See supra note 8.
198. 1 F.3d at 1294. The court distinguished its Armstrong I holding that the PRA precludes review by stating that the earlier opinion dealt with record creation, management, and
disposal decisions, rather than the "initial classification" decisions currently under consideration. 1 F.3d at 1293-94. The court also demonstrated the practical necessity of its ruling by
conjuring up a hypothetical guideline defining presidential records as "all records produced or
received by, or in the possession or under the control of, any government agency or employee of the United States." 1 F.3d at 1293. The court observed that "[r]eading the PRA to
forbid judicial review of such a guideline for conformity with the PRA definition of presidential records would be tantamount to allowing the PRA to functionally render the FOIA a
nullity." 1 F.3d at 1293.
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dent (BOP) and National Security Council (NSC) staff exercised
virtually complete discretion in deciding whether to preserve or delete electronic mail messages.199 The Archivist thus failed to carry
out duties required under the FRA, including inspecting agency
record management practices200 and notifying the head of the
agency of any FRA violations.201 In addition, if agency records
were indeed being destroyed in contravention of the FRA, the Archivist failed to request that the Attorney General take action.202
As a result, by the time the Armstrong litigation commenced on the
last day of the Reagan Administration, the only remaining e-mail
messages were those that individual White House officials chose
not to delete and those that were captured on backup tapes that
were recycled every few weeks.203 The Armstrong case thus shows
that insufficient administrative oversight of recordkeeping practices
can subvert the preservation of a complete record of government
decisionmak.ing. Moreover, Armstrong amply demonstrates the
need for judicial oversight of officials who fail to carry out their
enforcement duties under the FRA.
The poor performance of the FRA's enforcement scheme, with
its requirement that the Archivist oversee agency recordkeeping responsibilities, suggests that the PRA's purely discretionary scheme
cannot succeed. Although the FRA at least holds out the hope that
proper administrative enforcement will lead to appropriate agency
recordkeeping practices, the PRA offers no such prospect. While a
president is in office, neither the Archivist nor any other executive
branch official may interfere with decisions to dispose of presidential records.204 At most, Congress may pass legislation to prevent
destruction of presidential records,205 assuming that the Archivist
has first exercised the discretionary power to notify Congress of the
President's record disposal plans.206 Thus the PRA offers no administrative enforcement mechanism to block the inappropriate
199. See 1 F.3d at 1288 n.12 (noting that the Archivist "has never reviewed [NSC or EOP]
recordkeeping guidelines, and has never surveyed or inspected their e-mail systems"); Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 810 F. Supp. 335, 344-46 (D.D.C. 1993) (finding
that prior to 1988, EOP and NSC guidelines failed to instruct staff in proper handling of email information).
200. 44 U.S.C. § 2904(c)(7) (1988).
201. 44 u.s.c. § 2115(b) (1988).
202. See 44 U.S.C. § 2905(a) (1988) (requiring the Archivist to ask the Attorney General
to take action "for the recovery of records unlawfully removed and for other redress pro. vided by law" when the agency head fails to do so).
203. See Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343, 345, 347 (D.D.C. 1989).
204. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
205. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 13, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5744.
206. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(c)-(e) (1988).

February 1995]

Note -

White House Electronic Mail

825

disposal of presidential records, and Armstrong I holds that courts
also lack the power to prevent such action.201
This weakness defeats the PRA's purpose of ensuring the preservation of a documentary history of the presidency.2os Particularly
within the White House, where the line between presidential and
agency records is somewhat arbitrary209 and where there is no indication that one class of records is more valuable than the other,210
there is no justification for a legislative distinction that permits essentially unchecked destruction of some records but not others.
2. Strengthening the Enforcement Scheme
a. Administrative Oversight of Presidential Recordkeeping. In
order to preserve a complete record of presidential decisionmaking,
Congress shoul!f add an enforcement scheme to the PRA. First and
foremost, Congress should ensure that existing recordkeeping duties are performed by amending the PRA to provide administrative
oversight of p:residential recordkeeping. In order to effectuate this
administrative oversight, Congress should grant the Archivist the
same power to safeguard presidential records as is currently
granted by the FRA to safeguard agency records - namely, the
power to request that the Attorney General take action if presidential records are being unlawfully removed or destroyed.211
b. Requiring Presidential Recordkeeping Guidelines. Congress
should also amend the PRA to require the establishment of presidential recordkeeping guidelines. The Archivist is more likely to
abuse or arbitrarily exercise the power to involve the Attorney
General in presidential recordkeeping practices if presidential re- .
cordkeeping standards are vague or uncertain. Accordingly, in order to clearly delimit the Archivist's enforcement role, the PRA
must ensure that the Archivist can readily determine whether a decision to dispose of presidential records is proper. The FRA solves
this problem by thoroughly integrating the Archivist into the
agency recordkeeping process; for example, the FRA requires the
Archivist to issue guidelines to regulate agency record management.212 Congress should similarly amend the PRA to dictate that
the President must develop recordkeeping guidelines in coopera207. See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 196.
210. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing the Archivist's duty under
the FRA to request that the Attorney General take action); see also infra notes 239-40 and
accompanying text (considering and rejecting separation of powers objections to this
proposal).
.
212. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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tion with the Archivist.213 This approach offers the advantage of
ensuring that all White House officials are subject to consistent recordkeeping guidelines, whether they work with presidential or
agency records.214
c. · Private Causes of Action To Ensure Enforcement. Next,
Congress should amend both the PRA and the FRA tq provide explicitly a private right to challenge archivist inaction through the
courts. As noted earlier, the Archivist failed to invoke the FRA's
administrative enforcement mechanisms over the course of the
events leading to the Armstrong litigation;21s a private cause of action may therefore be necessary to spur enforcement action. The
D.C. Circuit has found that the APA grants private parties the right
to obtain review of recordkeeping and enforcement duties under
the FRA.216 Congress should explicitly affirm this judicial precedent, and thus prevent any chance of its being overturned, by
amending the FRA to authorize private-party suits challenging the
failure of an agency head or the Archivist to initiate an enforcement action.
·
Similarly, if Congress amends the PRA as suggested to enable
the Archivist to seek the Attorney General's assistance when presi213. Existing PRA language not only fails to involve the Archivist in the development of
presidential record management guidelines, it also falls short of mandating specific recordkeeping practices that, if not followed, could trigger enforcement action. Instead the PRA
simply requires,
Through the implementation of records management controls and other necessary actions, the President shall take all such steps as may be necessary to assure that the activities, deliberations, decisions, and policies that reflect the performance of his
constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties are adequately documented and that such records are maintained as Presidential records pursuant to the
requirements of this section and other provisions of law.
44 U.S.C. § 2203(a) (1988). This provision seems to leave the establishment of recordkeeping
guidelines largely to the President's discretion, and it thus does not provide a sufficient basis
for the Archivist to conclude that presidential records are being improperly destroyed.
As an alternative to involving the Archivist in development of presidential recordkeeping
guidelines, Congress could limit archivist enforcement responses to the occasions on which
presidential record disposals fail to follow existing PRA procedures. Because the PRA currently requires the President to obtain a written statement of the Archivist's views concerning a proposed record disposal, 44 U.S.C. § 2203(c}(l} (1988), Congress could permit the
Archivist to initiate enforcement action only when the President fails to follow this procedure. Although this limited administrative enforcement mechanism might at least address
the situation presented in Armstrong, Congress should go further and impose a duty to formulate guidelines that comport with the PRA.
214. This approach would also defeat the apparent attempt of the Clinton Administration
to claim that many White House officials are not bound by recordkeeping guidelines. See
Douglas Jehl, White House Curbs Access to Security Council's Data, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26,
1994, at A6 (reporting the White House position that all NSC materials are presidential
rather than agency records, based on the claim that the Armstrong decisions "had forced [the
White House] to choose between a legal position that would protect all its documents and
one that would protect none of them").
215. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 165-89 and accompanying text.
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dential records are being wrongfully removed or destroyed,217 then
private parties should be granted the right to. seek review of the
Archivist's failure to perform this PRA enforcement duty.21s Both
Armstrong and American Friends demonstrate the reluctance of the
Archivist to correct improper agency recordkeeping practices; absent a judicially enforceable duty, the Archivist is surely even less
likely to challenge presidential recordkeeping abuses. Moreover,
such limited review would likely render more searching review of
presidential recordkeeping practices unnecessary; the Armstrong
courts have been forced to carefully consider White House recordkeeping practices only because White House officials and the Archivist took virtually no action to preserve historically significant
electronic mail.219
In addition to authorizing review of archivist inaction, Congress
should also codify judicial review of agency guidelines under the
FRA and presidential guidelines under an amended PRA. Again,
both Armstrong and American Friends demonstrate the careless
tendency ~f agencies and the Archivist to permit widespread recordkeeping abuses, many of which were caused by inadequate instruction or oversight of agency officials.220 As the court in
American Friends observed, judicial review need not be overly burdensome; instead, "the papers NARS and an agency prepare in the
course of reaching records disposal decisions should make their actions easily reviewable with little or no extra work for them."221
Explicit provision for judicial review of recordkeeping guidelines
would signal a clear congressional intention that the historical preservation mandate of recordk~eping law should be aggressively
enforced.222
217. See supra text accompanying note 211.
218. The separation of powers concerns raised by this proposal are addressed infra at
notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
220. See American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(reporting the district court's finding that "the Archivist rarely exercised any review over FBI
records disposal practices during [a] thirty-year period"); Armstrong v. Executive Office of
the President, 810 F. Supp. 335, 344-45 (D.D.C. 1993) (noting various deficiencies in White
House recordkeeping guidelines and finding that "the EOP's record keeping guidance to the
staff .•. was not reasonably calculated to achieve the goals of the FRA").
221. 720 F.2d at 44.
222. Although Congress might also consider providing a private cause of action to challenge an individual's failure to comply with either the FRA or the PRA, such a change in the
enforcement scheme would raise numerous problems. As an initial matter, one might question whether private suits could effectively block unlawful individual recordkeeping practices,
particularly considering the time it would typically take for a private citizen to discover the
unlawful activity and initiate legal action. Furthermore, although private-party challenges to
individual compliance might potentially catch more transgressors, they would undercut the
preferred and congressionally sanctioned administrative enforcement roles, thereby prevent. ing the Archivist, a historian with particular record management expertise, from working
within the executive branch to ensure compliance without need for litigation. See Armstrong
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Congressional Power To Strengthen the Enforcement Scheme

Congress cited separation of powers concerns in the PRA's legislative history,223 and presumably these concerns led Congress to
grant incumbent presidents nearly complete discretion over presidential recordkeeping practices.224 These concerns, however, do
not justify the failure to give the Archivist any oversight or enforcement role under the PRA.225 Rather, Supreme Court decisions in
two cases suggest that the PRA amendments proposed above the grant of power to the Archivist to request that the Attorney
General take action in the event of unlawful removal or destruction
of presidential records and the involvement of the Archivist in formulating guidelines for presidential recordkeeping - would withstand a separation of powers challenge.
First, in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 226 the
Supreme Court held that congressional regulation of presidential
materials, standing alone, does not violate separation of powers
principles.227 Former President Nixon challenged legislation that
took over custody and control of his presidential materials and authorized an executive branch official to regulate public access to
those materials.2 28 The Court rejected this challenge, reasoning
v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 296 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting that under the FRA, the Archivist
and the agency head may attempt to prevent unlawful disposal of records through means
other than initiating legal action, such as "disciplining the staff involved in the unlawful action, increasing oversight by higher agency officials, or threatening legal action"). Thus it is
unclear whether a private right of action against individual violators would increase overall
compliance with recordkeeping law. Additionally, judicial oversight of the recordkeeping
practices of individual government employees raises separation of powers concerns by offering an opportunity for judicial disruption of executive branch functions at the behest of private parties.
.
Finally, private-party challenges to individual compliance with recordkeeping law might
impair preservation of a complete history of government decisionmaking. In the legislative
history of the PRA, Congress recognized that recordkeeping regulations can have a "chilling
effect" on the frank exchange of advice. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 8, reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5739; see also Sandra E. Richetti, Comment, Congressional Power vis a
vis the President and Presidential Papers, 32 Duo. L. REv. 773, 796-97 (1994) (expressing a
similar concern that excessive regulation of presidential recordkeeping could lead presidents
to "screen their own communications and less readily speak openly and freely"). The threat
of private lawsuits over individual recordkeeping practices could similarly chill open communications within the executive branch or could even lead to quicker and less thoughtful destruction of potentially embarrassing materials in order to prevent their premature disclosure
to parties outside the executive branch.
223. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5737.
224. See Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
225. But see Richetti, supra note 222, at 796-97 (suggesting that even as currently enacted, the PRA might not properly defer to a president's need for communications unchecked by any outside influence).
226. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
227. 433 U.S. at 441-45.
228. 433 U.S. at 429-30. The former President argued that "Congress is without power to
delegate to a subordinate officer of the Executive Branch the decision whether to disclose
Presidential materials and to prescribe the terms that govern any disclosure," because such a
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that the Constitution does not "contemplate[ ] a complete division
of authority between the three branches."229 Instead, "the proper
inquiry focuses on the extent to which [the challenged legislation]
prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions." 230 Moreover, the Court noted that custody
and control of the presidential materials remained within the executive branch, and it concluded that Congress was not impermissibly
disrupting executive branch functions.231
Similarly, in Morrison v. Olson, 232 the Supreme Court upheld
legislation authorizing the appointment of independent counsel
against a separation of powers challenge.233 As in Nixon, the Court
focused on the control retained by the executive branch. The Court
noted various means by which the Attorney General could exercise
control over the independent counsel; for example, the statute
granted the Attorney General unreviewable discretion in deciding
whether to seek appointment of an independent counsel and authorized the Attorney General to remove the counsel for "good
cause."234 The Court also observed that because Congress retained
only the power to impeach an independent counsel, "this case does
not involve an attempt by Congress to increase its own power at the
expense of the Executive Branch."235
The Morrison Court also found that the independent counsel
statute did not impermissibly transfer executive functions to the judiciary.236 Although the statute granted the judicial branch the
power to appoint an independent counsel, the Court noted that this
power could only be exercised "upon the specific request of the Attorney General."237 Finally, the Court upheld the statute's providelegation would constitute "an impermissible interference by the Legislative Branch into
matters inherently the business solely of the Executive Branch." 433 U.S. at 440.
229. 433 U.S. at 443.
230. 433 U.S. at 443. The Court found that mere interference with executive functions
does not invalidate the legislation; rather, "only where the potential for disruption is present
must we then determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote
objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress." 433 U.S. at 443. The Court then
cited several statutes, including the FRA and the FOIA, that permissibly regulate materials
in the possession of the executive branch. 433 U.S. at 445.
231. 433 U.S. at 443-45. The Court also found that the executive branch "became a party
to the Act's regulation when President Ford signed the Act into law." 433 U.S. at 441. Finally, the Court rejected a claim that the legislation violated the confidentiality of presidential communications, finding that "Congress can legitimately act to rectify the hit-or-miss
approach that has characterized past attempts to protect these substantial interests by entrusting the materials to expert handling by trusted and disinterested professionals." 433
U.S. at453.
232. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
233. 487 U.S. at 693-96.
234. 487 U.S. at 696.
235. 487 U.S. at 694.
236. 487 U.S. at 695.
237. 487 U.S. at 695.
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sion for judicial review of the Attorney General's decision to
remove an independent counsel, reasoning that such review "is a
function that is well within the traditional power of the
Judiciary."238
Nixon and Morrison therefore indicate that Congress may grant
the Archivist, an executive branch official appointed by the President,239 the power to request that the Attorney General take action
if presidential records are being improperly removed or destroyed.
Like the legislation upheld in Nixon and Morrison, a PRA provision that grants the Archivist a limited enforcement role leaves control over the executive function of presidential recordkeeping
within the executive branch. The Archivist can only request that
the Attorney General take action, and the Attorney General retains the discretion to decide whether to initiate legal action.24 0
Furthermore, as the Morrison Court emphasized, Congress would
gain no additional control over recordkeeping practices in the executive branch.
Nor would the courts be guilty of undue interference with executive branch functions. First, as in Morrison, the judicial branch
would only be called upon to consider the propriety of presidential
recordkeeping practices when requested to do so by two executive
branch officials, the Archivist and the Attorney General. Next, as
the Morrison Court emphasiied, a reviewing court would be performing a purely judicial function - namely, determining whether
allegedly wrongful recordkeeping practices violate the PRA and
should therefore be enjoined. Finally, if the Archivist and the Attorney General need to initiate legal action to prevent improper
destruction of presidential records, the presidential staff can hardly
respond that such an action disrupts the exercise of legitimate executive functions. Thus a PRA amendment that brings its enforcement mechanisms up to the level provided by the FRA should
survive a separation of powers challenge.
The proposed congressional authorization of a private cause of
action challenging the Archivist's failure to assume an enforcement
role,241 however, raises a different separation of powers issue. Unlike a case in which the Archivist and the Attorney General challenge presidential recordkeeping practices, a private challenge to
archivist inaction would vest control over litigation outside the ex238. 487 U.S. at 695.
239. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
240. Moreover, the Supreme Court's decision in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831·33
(1985), indicates that the Attorney General's decision whether to take legal action would be
presumptively unreviewable. Thus the Attorney General would be free to distinguish between charges of PRA noncompliance lodged against the President versus, for example,
against an NSC official who is acting without presidential authorization.
241. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
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ecutive branch. But given that Armstrong I already permits private
suits against the Archivist under the FRA,242 the same Archivist
duty ought not be exempt from review simply because the Archivist
allegedly is violating the PRA rather than the FRA. Of course,
presidential recordkeeping practices would inevitably be subject to
judicial scrutiny in such a suit; otherwise, a court could not decide
whether the Archivist had improperly failed to seek the Attorney
General's involvement. But so long as courts ensure that the primary focus of a private suit remains on the Archivist's inaction, the
resulting minimal interference with presidential recordkeeping is
offset by the substantial interest in ensuring that a history of presidential decisionmaking is preserved.243
Finally, a.PRA provision that authorizes private challenges to
presidential recordkeeping guidelines244 would not violate separation of powers principles, provided that the courts are not involved
in the initial development of those guidelines. Although a PRA
amendment that requires the Archivist and the President to formulate presidential recordkeeping guidelines would, obviously subject
the executive branch to additional regulation, Nixon makes clear
that such regulation is permissible as long as executive branch officials remain in control of the process of formulating guidelines.245
Particularly considering the strong public and congressional iriterest
in seeing that historically significant presidential records are properly preserved, Nixon indicates that Congress may impose additional recordkeeping duties on the executive branch. Moreover,
Armstrong II already establishes the right of private parties to claim
that White House recordkeeping guidelines improperly classify
records as presidential.246 Given these precedents, the slightly
more expansive review of presidential recordkeeping guidelines
proposed here ought not to violate separation of powers principles.
ill.

REGULATING ELECTRONIC

MAIL UNDER THE

ClJRRENT

STATUTORY SCIIEME

This Note has thus far examined the existing statutory framework that governs federal recordkeeping and record disclosure, and
242. See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 230 {discussing Nixon's balancing test for legislation that is found to
disrupt executive functions). In addition, the court in American Friends suggested that judicial review of the Archivist's actions generally will not be burdensome. See supra note 221
and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text. ,
245. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text (discussing Nixon's test for whether
legislation violates separation of powers principles and noting that Nixon cites numerous
examples of legislation that permissibly regulates materials in the possession of the executive
branch).
246. See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
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has surveyed the enforcement schemes that attempt to ensure compliance with recordkeeping law. Part I identified the broad and unified purpose behind the recordkeeping and record disclosure
statutes, and Part II proposed additional enforcement mechanisms
to achieve that purpose. But even assuming universal agreement
that recordkeeping law principally seeks to preserve historical
materials, a record of White House decisionmaking will not be preserved if the Archivist and White House officials fail to identify
properly and manage historically significant White House materials.
Accordingly, this Part addresses a fundamental substantive question: What attributes render government materials subject to regulation under federal recordkeeping and record disclosure law? This
in turn raises a procedural question: What guidelines will best identify and manage those materials that are subject to regulation?
This Part argues that government officials use electronic mail to
exchange historically significant information and concludes that email must therefore be managed under recordkeeping law. Because the statutes all speak of "records" as the basic unit of information subject to regulation, this Part first considers the scope of
the term records under federal law. Section ID.A argues that a test
for determining whether materials qualify as records should focus
on the government's use of those materials; alternative tests that
consider the content or form of government materials fail to identify information of historical value properly. Next, section III.B
proposes recordkeeping guidelines that address the specific challenges e-mail poses to historical preservation.

A. The Scope of Records Under the Existing Statutory Scheme
A case such as Armstrong that considers a novel form of government information247 will inevitably confront the question whether
such information counts as records and thereby qualifies for regulation under the FRA and the PRA and for disclosure under the
FOIA. There are at least two ways to determine what constitutes
records: according to content or according to function. 248 Under a
247. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text (observing that the Armstrong litigation raises unique issues because the plaintiffs are seeking preservation and disclosure of email).

248. A third alternative, a form-based approach to identifying records, has been resoundingly rejected by statutory language, courts, and commentators. First, the FRA's disposal
provisions define records as various "documentary materials, regardless of physical form or
characteristics." 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (1988). Similarly, the PRA defines presidential records as
"documentary materials," 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2) (1988), and then defines documentary materials by means of a laundry list of various collections of information that ends with the proviso
that the list "includ[es], but [is] not limited to, audio, audiovisual, or other electronic or
mechanical recordations," 44 U.S.C. § 2201{1) {1988).
Courts have also recognized that the transition from paper-based to computer-based government records does not bar public access via the FOIA. See Long v. IRS, 596 F.2d 362,
364-65 {9th Cir. 1979) {holding that the FOIA applies to computer tapes that contain the
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content-based approach, materials qualify as records when they
contain valuable information - of course, the notion of "value"
must be separately defined. In contrast, a functional approach to
defining records inquires whether the government has used the candidate materials in the conduct of its business.
This section first argues that the recordkeeping statutes provide
definitions of records that suggest a functional approach to identifying records. Next, this section considers whether a functional approach properly handles two problematic types of information personal materials and computer software. After comparing the
functional approach with a content-based alternative, this section
argues that the functional approach better identifies historically signifi.cant information. Finally, after applying the functional approach to e-mail, this section concludes that e-mail is subject to
regulation under recordkeeping law.

1. A Functional Approach To Identifying Records
Because both the FRA and PRA definitions of records249 refer
to the government's use of materials, both statutes suggest a funcsame information as IRS documents); see also Grodsky, supra note 31, at 21-23 (surveying
cases that apply the FOIA to electronic records); Leo T. Sorokin, The Computerization of

Government Information: Does it Circumvent Public Access Under the Freedom of Information Act and the Depository Library Program?, 24 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PR.OBS. 267, 271-73
(1991) (arguing that court cases, legislative history, and other government materials support
treating electronic records as within the scope of the FOIA). Nor is this rejection of a formbased test unique to computer-based information. As technology advances, government information is inevitably recorded on new media. and courts have accordingly found that motion pictures, audio recordings, and videotapes are subject to disclosure under the FOIA. See
Grodsky, supra note 31, at 23.
However, the form of the information may present logistical problems that block its disclosure. For example, when electronic data must be processed in some way before a FOIA
request can be satisfied, a court may deny the request if it finds that the processing amounts
to creation of new records. Compare Long, 596 F.2d at 366 (finding that "the mere deletion
of names, addresses, and social security numbers" from computer-based IRS records prior to
their disclosure did not constitute record creation) with Yeager v. Drug Enforcem~nt Admin., 678 F.2d 315, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that an agency need not " 'compact' or
'collapse' " computer-based data in order to meet its FOIA duty to provide "reasonably
segregable" nonexempt portions of records). See generally Grodsky, supra note 31, at 24-25
(surveying Supreme Court cases bearing on the issue of record creation); Sorokin, supra, at
276-77 (arguing that processing of computer data should not be equated with record creation). Depending on how future courts construe the agency duty to disclose "reasonably
segregable" information under the FOIA, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988), computer-based data
could be effectively shielded from FOIA disclosure because such data will frequently require
some processing to be both useful and nonexempt. See Grodsky, supra note 31, at 25-31
(analyzing cases that consider the issues of agency effort and expense in responding to FOIA
requests and citing agency FOIA regulations that establish extremely limited duties to process data in response to FOIA requests); Sorokin, supra, at 276-77 (also surveying cases and
agency FOIA guidelines, and expressing concern that agencies might "arbitrarily suppress
data by structuring their electronic retrieval systems to prevent public access to embarrassing
information").
249. Recall that the FOIA does not define records at all, and that the Supreme Court
decided in·one FOIA case to apply the FRA's definition. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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tional approach to identifying records. First, the FRA stipulates
that materials qualify as records only if they are "made or received
by an agency ... in connection with the transaction of public business. "250 Similarly, the PRA's definition of presidential records includes only those materials that are created or received by
presidential staff "in the course of conducting activities which relate
to or have an effect upon the carrying out of the ... duties of the
President. "251
By explicitly excluding "personal records" from its definition of
presidential records, 252 however, the PRA might appear to support
a content-based approach to identifying records. Moreover, a
content-based test of records might be an effective way to sift out
purely personal information that arguably does not belong in the
government's documentary history - surely recordkeeping law
should dictate preservation of policy statements but not invitations
to lunch. A content-based approach solves this problem by permitting disposal of those materials that contain personal information.
Nevertheless, the language of the PRA's personal information
exemption is more consistent with a functional approach. The PRA
defines personal records as materials "of a purely private or nonpublic character which do not relate to or have an effect upon the
carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties of the President."2 53 ijy focusing on the connection
between the materials in question and the performance of presidential duties, rather than attempting to classify the content of the
materials, this PRA language shows that a functional approach
identifies personal information just as effectively as a content-based
approach.254 For example, if the government has not used an invi250. 44 u.s.c. § 3301 (1988).
251. 44 u.s.c. § 2201(2) (1988).
252.. See 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2)(B)(ii) (1988).
253. 44 U.S.C. § 2201(3) (1988}. This definition also· provides illustrative examples of
personal records, such as "diaries ..• which are not prepared or utilized for, or circulated or
communicated in the course of, transacting Government business." 44 U.S.C. § 2201(3)(A)
(1988). See, for example, United States v. North, 708 F. Supp. 402, 403-04 (D.D.C. 1989}, in
which the government sought production of Oliver North's spiral notebooks as part of a
criminal proceeding. The government argued that the notebooks were covered by the PRA
and that consequently they were government documents in the custody of North. 708 F.
Supp. at 403. The court rejected this argument, stating that "[a]t best, North's notebooks are
governmental only to the extent that segregable portions are shown to have aided him in
performing his activities while he was working at the National Security Council." 708 F.
Supp. at 403. Because the government could not specifically show that portions of the notebooks were both relevant and used by North in his official capacity and because "the statutes
are unclear and in a state of flux regarding which government workers are custodians, what
documents are governmental or Presidential, and what the duties of government officials are
regarding documents containing both notes of official matters and more personal material,"
the court declined to order North to produce the notebooks. 708 F. Supp. at 404.
254. The House report accompanying the PRA amplifies this point by discussing materials used by the President in conducting political activities; although records of political activi-
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tation to lunch in the conduct of its business, then the invitation
need not be preserved, regardless of whether its contents are considered "personal."
Similarly, a functional test of records solves the dilemma
presented by FOIA requests for disclosure of arguably personal information. The FOIA does not explicitly exempt personal information from disclosure,255 and it also provides that requests for
disclosure may only be denied on grounds "specifically stated"
within the statute.256 Yet courts may be reluctant to order the disclosure of materials that reveal the purely personal thoughts of
agency officials.257 Accordingly, they must develop a threshold test
of agency records that excludes personal information without resort
to the FOIA's nine statutory exemptions.
In Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. (BNA) v. United States Department of Justice, 258 the D.C. Circuit found that a functional test
of agency records most appropriately shields personal materials
from disclosure.259 The plaintiff in BNA sought disclosure of telephone message slips, appointment calendars, and daily agendas.260
Because the telephone message slips and appointment calendars
simply helped individuals organize and conduct their own daily
business and were not distributed among agency officials, the court
concluded that they were exempt from disclosure.261 In contrast,
the court found that the daily agendas, which were circulated
among agency staff, were agency records subject to disclosure beties might ordinarily be viewed as "personal," the report states that "an examination of the
nature of political activities in which a President becomes involved shows that few are truly
private and unrelated to the performance of his duties." H.R. REP. No. 1481,supranote 4, at
12, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5743.
255. Although one of the FOIA's nine statutory exemptions from disclosure speaks of
"intra-agency memorandums or letters," 5 U.S.C. § 552{b)(5) {1988), and another exempts
"personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," 5 U.S.C. § 552{b)(6) (1988), the FOIA
does not flatly exempt personal information from disclosure.
256. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) {1988).
257. See, e.g., Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League v. United States
Atomic Energy Commn., 380 F. Supp. 630, 633 {N.D. Ind. 1974) (expressing concern that
disclosure of handwritten notes "would invade the privacy of and impede the working habits
of individual staff members").
258. 742 F.2d 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
259. 742 F.2d at 1493-94.
260. 742 F.2d at 1486-88. Noting that the Kissinger case involved a similar FOIA request
for transcripts of telephone conversations, the BNA court invoked four factors suggested by
the Supreme Court to determine what counts as an agency record: "whether the document
was generated within the agency, has been placed into the agency's files, is in the agency's
control, and has been used by the agency for an agency purpose." 742 F.2d at 1494 (construing Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 157 {1980)). Tue
Kissinger Court did not decide whether transcripts of telephone conversations qualify as
agency records. 445 U.S. at 147.
261. 742 F.2d at 1495-96. .
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cause the agendas were created not for "personal convenience, but
for the convenience of [the] staff in their conduct of official business."262 By focusing on the use of the materials within the agency
rather than their content, the court adopted a functional approach
to identifying agency records.263
Fmally, a functional test of records properly identifies nontraditional collections of information - for example, computer software
- as candidates for preservation and disclosure. Because such
novel materials do not fit within a traditional notion of records,
agencies have argued that they need not be disclosed.264 But any
approach that categorically denies that software is a record would
lead to disclosure of agency data without disclosure of the agency
software that is often essential to understanding the data and the
agency's use of them.265 In contrast, a functional approach would
identify as records any computer software used by agency officials
to analyze data as part of their decisionmaking process,266 and it
thus would avoid fruitless inquiry into the informational value or
record-like form of the software.
262. 742 F.2d at 1495.
263. See 742 F.2d at 1494. Moreover, the court explicitly rejected a content-based test for
identifying agency records, finding that the presence of personal information "does not, by
itself, take material outside the ambit of FOIA, for personal information can be redacted"
prior to disclosure. 742 F.2d at 1496. Rather, the presence of personal information may
simply indicate the "author's intended use of the documents at the time he or she created
them," and thus should be considered only as a factor in determining whether materials were
used for agency purposes. 742 F.2d at 1496.
264. See, e.g., Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton v. Department of Health & Human
Servs., 844 F. Supp. 770, 781 (D.D.C. 1993) (noting the agency's claim that computer programs are not records because "each program is merely a list of instructions for a computer
to manipulate a database"); see also Grodsky, supra note 31, at 34 ("Some agencies have
suggested that software is a tool used to manipulate information rather than a record ••• .'').
265. A variation on this problem was presented in Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Admin.,
678 F.2d 315 (D.C. Cir. 1982), in which the D.C. Circuit considered a FOIA request for both
computer-based data compiled by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and technical information describing the format and encoded content of the computer data. 678 F.2d at
317. The DEA argued that the FOIA's "intra-agency memorandums or letters" exemption, 5
U.S.C. § 552(b}(5} (1988), should apply to the technical information because it was only used
within the agency to store its data. 678 F.2d at 326. The court did not decide the issue but
noted the district court's finding that if the plaintiff's request for computer-based data were
granted, then the data itself would no longer be solely "intra-agency," and consequently
" 'the codes necessary to read and use the tapes would become more than intra-agency
records.'" 678 F.2d at 326 (quoting Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Admin., No. 76 Civ. 973,
slip op. at 9 (D.D.C. May 1, 1979) (memorandum order)). This suggests that agency data and
the agency software used to analyze that data should be considered together, especially because the data might be virtually worthless if disclosed without the technical information
necessary to decode it. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Federal Electronic Information Policy, 63
TEMP. L REv. 201, 233 (1990) ("Assuming the electronic form of the underlying data is a
record, there is no apparent reason why software and indices are not records also.'' (footnotes omitted)}; see also Grodsky, supra note 31, at 33-34 (discussing treatment of computer
software as agency records under the FOIA); Sorokin, supra note 248, at 275 n.66 (same).
266. Of course, even if computer software qualifies as agency records, it might still be
exempt from disclosure under an FOIA exemption or, if it is a commercial product, under
copyright law. See Perritt, supra note 265, at 233.
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An agency's computer software might also qualify as records
under a content-based approach if the software incorporates substantive information about agency activities. In fact, the court in
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton v. Department of Health &
Human Services261 adopted this content-based approach in finding
that computer programs used by a government researcher qualified
as agency records. 268 Because the computer programs had been
specifically developed by the researcher in order to analyze agency
data, the court found that they fell within a "common-sense definition" of agency records that includes any materials "written or transcribed to perpetuate knowledge or events. "269 This definition
enabled the court to distinguish between "generic word processing
or prefabricated software" and software designed by an agency researcher to analyze particular agency data; only the latter can be
said to embody government knowledge.210
This "common-sense" definition's admirable distinction between agency and generic software, however, is outweighed by its
overbreadth in other contexts. For example, diaries and other personal documents clearly are intended to "perpetuate knowledge or
events," yet BNA properly holds that they are not agency records
unless they are used for agency purposes.211 By ignoring the
agency's use of materials, Cleary's content-based approach improperly treats as agency records any materials in the possession of
agency officials that include any useful information whatsoever.272
2. Electronic Mail Under a Functional Approach
Electronic mail systems promise the ability to exchange information easily, conveniently, and freely within a community. When
an individual sets out to communicate with a colleague, e-mail offers certain advantages. First, the colleague need not be in the office, near a phone, or otherwise available to receive the message,
because the mailbox is always available.273 Second, communication
267. 844 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1993).
268. 844 F. Supp. at 781-82.
269. 844 F. Supp. at 781-82 (relying on a definition of record from Diviaio v. Kelley, 571
F.2d 538, 542 (10th Cir. 1978)).
270. 844 F. Supp. at 782. Although the programs at issue in the case qualified as agency
records, the court held them exempt from disclosure under the FOIA's "intra-agency memorandums or letters" exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1988), also known as the "deliberative
process privilege." 844 F. Supp. at 782-83. Because "the computer programs reflect their
creator's mental processes," the court found that they comprised a part of the deliberative
process by which the researcher analyzed her data. 844 F. Supp. at 783.
271. See 742 F.2d at 1496.
272. Moreover, C/eary's approach is not necessarily required to prevent disclosure of generic or commercial software, because such software may be exempt from disclosure for
other reasons. See supra note 266.
273. MATTHEW RAPAPORT, CoMPUTER MEDIATED COMMUNICATIONS 2 (1991).
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via e-mail is generally reliable and trackable; electronic messages
are less easily lost in transit than their paper counterparts, and several e-mail systems offer the option of notifying the sender when
the message has been received.274 Third, if the sender has a computer within reach, no other equipment or personnel is required:
no printer, no secretary to take dictation and type the message, no
messenger.275 Finally, assuming availability of a computer network,
messages can be delivered almost instantaneously to remote locations.276 In addition to these "user-friendly" attributes, e-mail systems also provide behind-the-scenes management features, such as
immediat~ capture of all messages in an electronic form suitable for
long-term storage and maintenance of separate, private mailboxes
for each individual.211
Because the convenience of e-mail has led to heavy use by government officials,278 e-mail generally qualifies for preservation and
disclosure under a functional test of record status.279 Extensive
governmental communication via e-mail, however, also implies that
the content of e-mail can vary widely from one message to the next.
As content moves from one end of the substantive spectrum, where
the message is essentially equivalent to a paper memorandum but is
simply sent through a different medium, to the other, where the
message is perhaps an off-the-cuff equivalent to a remark made
while passing in the hallway, the demand for historical preservation
diminishes. E-mail thus presents a concrete and substantial challenge for a functional approach to identifying records. In particular, in order to handle e-mail effectively, a functional approach
must both screen out purely personal e-mail messages and solve the
problem presented by preliminary policy musings.
274. See THOMAS B. CRoss & MAR.JORIE B. RAlzMAN, NETWORKING: AN ELECTRONIC
MAn. HANDBOOK 5-7 (1986).
275. Id. at 10.
276. Id. at 3.
277. See Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1279-80 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (describing the e-mail systems in use in the White House).
278. See Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at 1279 (noting the heavy use of the EOP and NSC e-mail
systems); see also OTA, INFORMING THE NATION, supra note 31, at 34 (showing that over
40% of the federal agencies responding to a 1987 survey used e-mail systems).
279. Cf. Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at 1279 (observing that White House e-mail systems have
been used "to relay lengthy substantive - even classified - 'notes' that, in content, are
often indistinguishable from letters or memoranda"); Perritt, supra note 145, at 974 (predicting that government policymaking will increasingly be done electronically).
Closer to home, however, the University of Michigan recently denied that its electronic
communications systems were being used for official purposes. See Dan Gillmor, Privacy on
the Line: U-M Defends Sanctity of Electronic Exchanges, DETROIT FRIIB PREss, Apr. 15,
1994, at lA, 9A. Although the University, as the target of a lawsuit brought under Michigan's open meetings law, voluntarily released transcripts of an electronic conference in which
University regents had participated, the University denied that it was legally obligated to do
so. Id. Moreover, a University official made the dubious claim that "[t]he regents would
never conduct business by electronic means - have never and will never." Id.
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A functional test of record status not only properly identifies
personal e-mail messages, it also provides an easily applied method
of distinguishing between personal and governmental messages.
This screening capability is essential because e-mail systems, by offering a convenient mode of communication, frequently capture
personal information. If it were too burdensome to identify personal e-mail messages, an agency could argue that an e-mail system
permeated with personal information should be shielded from disclosure280 and perhaps even immune from recordkeeping law. As
exemplified in RNA, however, a functional approach repudiates
any broad claim that certain types of materials are inherently personal and hence not records. 281 Instead, a functional approach demands that the record status of each e-mail message be determined
by its role in government decisionmaking. Moreover, a functional
test enables government officials to determine easily the record status of e-mail messages as they are being composed; if a message
contributes to a decisionmaking process, it qualifies as a record
without need to decide whether it is personal.282
Similarly, a functional approach solves the problem presented
by e-mail messages that include preliminary policy formulations.
Although such messages deal with matters of substantive policy, the
need to preserve them arguably diminishes as they move toward
more transitory or preliminary policy musings.283 The failure to
280. See supra notes 248, 253 (observing that courts have shielded records from disclosure based on the difficulty of segregating exempt from nonexempt information).
281. See supra note 263 (noting BNA's rejection of a content-based test for personal
materials).
282. Indeed, the inquiry in an e-mail message case will be easier than when, for example,
diaries or personal calendars are under consideration, because e-mail messages will nearly
always be circulated among government officials rather than used by a single individual.
Thus the inquiry reduces to the question whether a message relates to government business.
283. Various government guidelines suggest different solutions to this dilemma. On the
one hand, the NARA recordkeeping guidelines for federal agencies dictate that "[w]orking
files, such as preliminary drafts and rough notes" must be maintained if they were "made
available . • • for official purposes such as approval, comment, action, recommendation,
follow-up, or to communicate with agency staff about agency business," and if "[t]hey contain
unique information, such as substantive annotations or comments included therein, that adds
to a proper understanding of the agency's formulation and execution of basic policies, decisions, actions, or responsibilities." 36 C.F.R. § 1222.34(c) (1992). On the other hand, a Department of Defense (DOD) FOIA regulation contends that "internal advice,
recommendations, and subjective evaluations, as contrasted with factual matters, that are
reflected in records pertaining to the decisionmaking process of an agency" are generally
exempt from FOIA disclosure. 32 C.F.R. § 286.13(a)(5) (1994). This DOD regulation does
not flatly contradict the NARA guideline, because the DOD regulation simply interprets the
FOIA "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters" exemption from disclosure, 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1988}; see also Perritt, supra note 145, at 975 (asserting that "predecisional electronic transactions likely are protected" by the intra-agency memorandums exception}, rather than contending that such preliminary records need not even be preserved. The
DOD statement, however, does represent another possible approach to preservation of email, under which final agency decisions must be preserved but messages reflecting interim
deliberations may be discarded. See OTA, INFORMING nm NATION, supra note 31, at 234
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preserve interim policy formulations, however, would remove the
nuances of government decisionmaking from the historical record
and thus would arguably fail to meet the historical preservation
mandate of recordkeeping law. In particular, the policies the government considers and rejects are often just as significant a part
of history as the policies the government ultimately pursues.284 Accordingly, by making J;l.O distinction between interim and final policy statements, a functional approach to identifying records
properly ensures that e-mail messages that contribute to policy formulation at any stage qualify for preservation under recordkeeping
law.28s
B. Proposed Guidelines for Management of Electronic Mail
By endorsing a functional approach to identifying records, the
previous section argued that the technology used to communicate
information is irrelevant to determining whether that information
qualifies as records under the federal statutory scheme. But even if
an agency recognizes that its use of a particular technology results
in records, that technology may still present difficult record management issues. This section examines e-mail as an example of a
technology that captures information in a form that resists management under a traditional record-based approach. Yet because email systems do capture historically significant government information, officials who formulate record management guidelines
must find a way to fit e-mail into the existing scheme. Accordingly,
this section outlines the necessary features of guidelines that address the record management difficulties presented by e-mail and
(suggesting that for both FOIA disclosure and record retention purposes, it might be necessary to "distinguish[] between deliberations and final orders"); see also Perritt, supra note
145, at 987-88 (stating that "the goal of capturing draft documents in order to record the
process of policy-making is, to a considerable extent, unrealistic," but noting that the NARA
staff disagrees with this conclusion).
284. For example, the events of the Cuban missile crisis seem all the more compelling
when augmented with the historical record that shows that Kennedy Administration officials
contemplated the use of nuclear weapons. See Peter Kombluh & Sheryl Walter, History Held
Hostage; 30 Years Later, We're Still Leaming the Secrets of the Cuban Missile Crisis, WASH.
Posr, Oct. 11, 1992, at C2.
285. These deliberations need not be immediately disclosed. The FOIA exempts deliberative materials, see supra note 270, thus leaving disclosure to agency discretion. Cf. American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting that a time
delay might be appropriate before releasing the historical record to private researchers). In
addition, the PRA permits delayed disclosure of "confidential communications requesting or
submitting advice," 44 U.S.C. § 2204(a)(5) (1988), but authorizes neither disposal of such
communications nor continued withholding once the restrictive period has expired. See H.R.
REP. No. 1~7, supra note 4, at 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5745; see also supra
notes 94-99 and accompanying text (describing the PRA categorical restrictions that delay
public disclosure of presidential materials).
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contrasts these proposals with e-mail guidelines recently developed
by the NARA.286
In particular, guidelines for appropriate management of e-mail
should include the following five features. First, guidelines should
provide nuanced yet clear instruction to government employees,
rather than prescribing broad rules such as "save everything." Second, guidelines should evince the historical preservation mandate
of recordkeeping law. Third, the Archivist. should be given the opportunity to express an opinion in difficult cases. Fourth, guidelines
should seek to integrate e-mail systems into computer-based archival systems. Fifth, and finally, guidelines should encourage immediate segregation of nonrecord information such as personal
materials.

1. The Need for Specificity in Electronic Mail Guidelines
Federal government electronic mail guidelines must avoid the
pitfalls of either a "save all" or a "save nothing" approach and instead should stake out a middle ground that encourages judicious
preservation of historically significant e-mail messages. As noted
earlier, e-mail systems tend to be heavily used and therefore tend to
capture information of varying historical importance.287 Accordingly, appropriate retention and disposal of the information within
e-mail systems demands recognition of both administrative needs
and historical value. A guideline that simply dictates that everything be saved serves neither of these needs. Indeed, unguided government use and retention of e-mail would not only exhaust limited
resources,288 but would also threaten the goal of historical preservation by facilitating the collection of an undifferentiated and largely
unmanageable mass of information without regard for its importance.289 Conversely, a guideline that grants individuals wide discretion to dispose of e-mail fails to meet the mandate of federal
recordkeeping law that historically valuable materials must be pre286. See 59 Fed. Reg. 13,906 {1994).
287. See supra notes 273-78 and accompanying text.
288. See Perritt, supra note 145, at 983-84 (noting that although electronic technologies
can store more information in less space, electronic storage systems still "have finite
capacities").
289. See Grodsky, supra note 31, at 26 ("[A]s federal agency communication via electronic mail and other electronic vehicles intensifies, government records may have the potential to become 'buried' within computer systems."); cf. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 160 {1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("We could hardly assume that Congress intended agencies to be prevented from
surrendering all documents that might be of interest to [FOIA] requesters - so broad a rule
would not only swamp the agencies with paper, but would also seem incompatible with the
records management goals of the [FRA].").
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served.290 The NARA's e-mail guidelines recognize this, stating
that "[b]ecause of the widespread use of E-mail for conducting
agency business, many E-mail documents meet the definition of a
'record' under the Federal Records Act. "291 E-mail guidelines
therefore should explicitly direct staff to retain those e-mail
messages that have been circulated in the conduct of government
business.292
Nor should government officials attempt to avoid their e-mail
management responsibilities by declaring that e-mail systems may
not be used for government business.293 This approach fails to recognize the inevitable move toward policymaking through the means
of electronic mail, particularly given its inherent convenience,294
Worse yet, it actually creates work for government officials who
wish to preserve historical materials because they must incorporate
any substantive information initially included in e-mail messages
into separate documents that fit within a narrow conception of
records. Such an approach thus offers a choice between forsaking
the full power of e-mail as an efficient and convenient communication tool and wasting effort by duplicating all substantive information communicated through e-mail. Under either option, the
government sacrifices both administrative efficiency and preservation of history. Guidelines that discourage policymaking via e-mail
are therefore inconsistent with both bases of recordkeeping law.
Finally, in light of the considerable power of individuals to destroy e-mail records, guidelines must be clear and specific in order
to be effective and enforceable. With each individual able to au290. Unfortunately, the White House initially adopted this approach to e-mail management, granting its agency staff complete discretion to determine which messages to save and
which to delete. See Annstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 810 F. Supp. 335, 342-43
(D.D.C. 1993). In fact, the district court found that NSC recordkeeping guidelines encouraged staff to treat electronic mail as nonrecord materials. 810 F. Supp. at 343.
291. 59 Fed. Reg. 13,907 (1994); see also Annstrong v. Executive Office of the President,
1 F.3d 1274, 1282-83 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding that White House agency e-mail systems create
records under the FRA and that the agencies must therefore apply the FRA's disposal standards before destroying e-mail messages).
292. See 59 Fed. Reg. 13,908 (1994) (discussing the record status of e-mail messages in
light of the FRA definition of records); see also supra section III.A (arguing for a functional
test of record status).
293. For example, the White House Office of Administration, a component of the Executive Office of the President, issued a guideline dictating that "[e]lectronic mail should not be
used to convey official records information." Armstrong, 810 F. Supp. at 345. If a staff member nonetheless sent or received a message that included record-like information, the guideline dictated that "the message should either be incorporated into a memorandum, or
reduced to paper." 810 F. Supp. at 345. An NSC memorandum included a similar instruction: "Electronic mail should not be used to convey substantive information about policy
issues when such information is not already contained or will not otherwise be contained in a
written federal or presidential record." 810 F. Supp. at 347 n.27.
294. See supra note 278 and accompanying text; cf. Perritt, supra note 145, at 964 {"President Bush reportedly used a personal computer to sketch American policy goals in the early
hours of the Soviet coup.").
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tonomously manage her own mailbox, a convenient system means
convenient deletion of messages.295 This capacity for destruction is
substantial; an entire mailbox of e-mail messages can typically be
emptied with a few simple keystrokes and without opportunity for
anyone to intercede or for the perpetrator to reflect further. Because recordkeeping law depends on administrative oversight to ensure individual compliance,296 executive officials charged with
enforcement of recordkeeping law must rely on guidelines that
clearly articulate and explain the criteria to be applied when judging whether an e-mail message must be preserved.297 Detailed
guidelines ensure that individuals who make day-to-day recordkeeping decisions are properly informed about the historical preservation mandate of recordkeeping law, and they also provide a
concrete b·asis for taking enforcement action should an individual
fail to comply.
2. Serving the Historical Preservation Mandate
of Recordkeeping Law

When establishing specific criteria for e-mail management, government officials must evaluate each criterion in light of the overarching historical preservation goal of recordkeeping law. The
district covrt in Armstrong II articulated an overall principle that
any guideline should recognize: "[G]iven the FRA's goal of the
preservation of records for historical purposes, the Defendants
should err, if at all, on the side of preservation.''298 Similarly, in
American Friends, the D.C. Circuit found that the FBl's record disposal criteria did not sufficiently account for historical value; rather,
the FBl's record disposal schedules demonstrated "that the FBI
was only concerned about preserving. records that might serve its
own institutional needs." 299 The court also rejected the FBl's treatment of so-called transitory documents, documents that were substantively incorporated into more "permanent" documents; the
court found that such perfunctory characterization of documents
could not be used to short-circuit a proper inquiry into a document's "administrative, legal, or research value."300 Accordingly,
295. See Perritt, supra note 145, at 984.
296. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text
297. The NARA's proposed e-mail standards emphasize that "[i]t is critical ... that agencies provide sufficient information for users to distinguish Federal records from nonrecord
materials." 59 Fed. Reg. 13,908 (1994); see also American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster,
720 F.2d 29, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding that the FRA requires agencies to provide a "reasoned justification" for recordkeeping decisions).
298. Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 810 F. Supp. 335, 343 (D.D.C. 1993).
299. 720 F.2d at 65.
300. 720 F.2d at 67-68; see also 59 Fed. Reg.13,908 (1994) (requiring preservation of draft
documents circulated via e-mail if "they contain unique information, such as annotations or
comments, that helps explain the formulation or execution of agency policies, decisions, ac-
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rather than providing categorical rules stating that certain types of
materials need not be preserved, guidelines should incorporate a
test of record status that identifies historically significant materials.
3. Giving the Archivist a Voice in Recordkeeping Decisions

Government e-mail management guidelines should seek to take
advantage of the Archivist's unique perspective and expertise as a
historian. As justification for the PRA provision that requires the
President to obtain the views of the Archivist prior to disposing of
records,301 a House report noted "the maxim that 'those closest to
the making of history are often the least able to judge the
si[gn]ificance of their actions.' "302 Accordingly, guidelines should
give the Archivist an opportunity to provide a second opinion in
recordkeeping decisions, particularly in borderline cases. For example, a guideline could instruct staff that "when in doubt, forward
the record to the Archivist for an independent determination of its
preservation value."
4. Preserving Electronic Mail in Computer-Based Archival
Systems

In order to establish an easily accessible and comprehensive historical record of government decisionmaking, government e-mail
guidelines should advocate the integration of electronic communications into true archival systems.303 On the one hand, e-mail systems offer the promise of easy archiving because they capture
information in electronic form. On the other hand, e-mail systems
are designed for communication, not for archival purposes. A
guideline must therefore reconcile e-mail's automatic capture of information with its threat of information diffusion.
Because the government has a well-established system for
archiving paper-based records, recordkeeping officials might be
tempted to archive e-mail by reducing all historically significant
messages to paper. Indeed, the White House initially adopted this
solution to e-mail management by instructing staff to print "hardtions, or responsibilities"); supra notes 283-85 and accompanying text (demonstrating that a
functional test of record status requires preservation of e-mail messages that include interim
policy formulations).
301. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
302. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 13, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5744.
303. This section uses archival to describe a system that is designed to capture and preserve information in an organized and coherent form that permits straightforward searches
and retrievals by re~archers. For example, a database is an archival computer system. See
Perritt, supra note 145, at 986 (contrasting an archival approach with the approach traditionally taken by the National Archives, under which agencies simply forwarded information to
the Archives in whatever format was best for its original use).

February 1995]

Note -

White House Electronic Mail

845

copy" versions of any e-mail messages that qualified as records. 304
This approach would be defensible, however, only if the original
electronic message and its paper form were informationally
equivalent. But as the D.C. Circuit found in Armstrong II, paper
printouts of e-mail messages are not sufficiently duplicative to justify deletion of the underlying electronic messages.3os The court
identified two important differences between the hard copies and
the underlying messages. First, a hard copy may identify senders
and lists of recipients through codes that can only be translated by
means of additional information not captured in the hard copy.306
Second, the sender of a message may request an "acknowledgement," consisting of a return receipt of the date and time the recipient viewed the message, but this acknowledgement information is
not captured in the hard copy.307 The court concluded that the
FRA's broad record.keeping mandate does not "grant agencies the
discretion to automatically lop off a predesignated part of a whole
series of documents that qualify as records. "308
In addition to the deficiencies noted by the court, the hard-copy
approach to e-mail preservation fails to take advantage of the fact
that the information contained in e-mail messages has already been
captured within a computer. Historians stand to lose in two ways if
the government preserves initially computer-based information in
paper form. First, under a paper-based scheme, the Archivist
would face the difficult task of sifting through paper records and
retaining only those that are appropriate for preservation; the difficulty of this job suggests that the historical record will suffer as a
consequence. This task would be far easier if the Archivist could
use advanced computer technology to examine government information that was created, and continues to exist, in electronic
form.309 Second, a historian who files a FOIA request generally
would prefer - and, with the proliferation of computer technology,
will increasingly prefer - that the information be disclosed in a
304. See Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 810 F. Supp. 335, 340 (D.D.C.
1993).
305. Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1282-87 (D.C. Cir.
1993). The White House defense of this approach was based on the FRA definition of
records, which excludes "extra copies of documents preserved only for convenience of reference." 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (1988). The White House claimed that the hard copies rendered the
original messages mere "extra copies" that could be deleted. 1 F.3d at 1284.
306. 1 F.3d at 1284.
307. 1 F.3d at 1284.
308. 1 F.3d at 1286. The court also rejected the White House claim that the FRA requirement that materials be "appropriate for preservation," 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (1988), grants agencies the discretion to decide that the information lost in reducing e-mail to hard copies does
not merit preservation. 1 F.3d at 1285-86.
309. See Perritt, supra note 145, at 987-88 (discussing the more sophisticated information
archiving made possible by the underlying records existing in electronic rather than paper
form).
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computer-based format, because that format makes organization
and analysis of the information easier.310 Saving only hard copies
of e-mail messages obviously frustrates such a desire. E-mail guidelines should therefore take advantage of technological advances
rather than rebelling against them.311
In addition to providing that e-mail should remain in electronic
form, guidelines must ensure the preservation of all information
necessary to understand the underlying messages. Even if messages
are faithfully preserved in individual mailboxes and even if those
mailboxes are regularly copied to long-term storage, such as computer tapes, a historian who obtains the contents of an e-mail system will still face the daunting task of trying to interpret the data.
As the Armstrong II court observed, e-mail messages often contain
embedded codes - for example, a code name of a list of message
recipients that the sender uses as a shorthand in lieu of having to
type in the name of each individual recipient.312 The information
necessary to translate these codes is often maintained separately
from the mailboxes within the computer313 and thus might be overlooked when the contents of an e-mail system are backed up on
computer tape, archived, or disclosed. If the government fails to
preserve this code-related information, the historical value of the email messages will be diminished.314
Finally, e-mail guidelines should encourage the transfer of email from individual mailboxes to a true archival system, because
the failure to do so will impede historical analysis of the information captured in e-mail systems. A historian who gains access to an
e-mail system would have to sift through a collection of messages
that is typically not integrated beyond the level of individual mailboxes. Furthermore, the software available to gain access to e-mail
messages will, again, be geared exclusively toward management of
individual mailboxes and consequently will be of little use to a historian who is more interested in examining the mail from all mailboxes that pertains to a particular subject. Unlike databases that
can often be exchanged among different types of computer systems,
310. See Grodsky, supra note 31, at 32 ("Paper printouts and other customary means of
distributing computer-stored information may no longer satisfy public access needs.");
Sorokin, supra note 248, at 277-78 (noting that by disclosing computer-based information in
paper form, "[t]he agency has actually denied the [FOIA] requester one of the attributes of
its records: that they can be easily analyzed on a computer").
311. See 59 Fed. Reg. 13,909 (1994) ("Agencies should consider the advantages of maintaining their records electronically.").
312. 1 F.3d at 1280.
313. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 810 F. Supp. 335, 341
(D.D.C. 1993) (noting that this is true of the White House electronic mail systems).
314. In fact, the Armstrong II court suggested that the information necessary to interpret
e-mail messages itself qualifies as records and therefore must be preserved under recordkeeping law. 1 F.3d at 1284 n.8.
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e-mail systems are usually hardware- and operating system-dependent, meaning that a historian must match an agency's computer
system in order to read that agency's e-mail.315 For example, in order to read tapes containing White House e-mail messages, the
Armstrong plaintiffs would very likely either have to purchase a
computer system that is compatible with the one used in the White
House or develop custom computer software that translates the email into a more useful form. These potential pitfalls all demonstrate the need for a guideline that encourages the transfer of electronic communications to true archival systems, rather than one
that simply calls for preservation of raw e-mail data that will be of
limited use to historians.316
5. Segregating Nonrecord Electronic Mail
Finally, government e-mail guidelines should require that nonrecord information such as personal materials be quickly segregated
from those e-mail messages that qualify as records. Expeditious
segregation of nonrecord information makes the Archivist's job
easier by reducing the amount of material that must be processed.
Furthermore, the PRA dictates that materials must, "to the extent
practicable," be designated as either presidential or personal
records and must thereafter be separately maintained.317 The
NARA's e-mail guidelines suggest that this can be achieved by adding a feature to e-mail systems that allows staff to "tag messages as
record or nonrecord";318 any messages tagged as records could immediately be copied to an archival system, rendering the original
messages redundant and subject to deletion.319 E-mail guidelines
should also emphasize that government officials may not simply label e-mail messages as "personal" and thereby end the inquiry into
the preservation value of each message.320 Indeed, guidelines
315. See Perritt, supra note 145, at 993.
316. See Perritt, supra note 145, at 965 ("An idea shared widely among information systems professionals is that the best way to ensure retention of electronic records having archival value is to design information systems with inherent archival features.").
317. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(b) (1988}. Similarly, NARA recordkeeping regulations dictate that
personal papers be maintained separately from agency records. 36 C.F.R. § 1222.36(b}
(1992). The NARA regulation also states that if a document contains both personal and
agency information, "the document shall be copied at the time of receipt, with the personal
information deleted, and treated as a Federal record." 36 C.F.R. § 1222.36(c) (1992).
318. 59 Fed. Reg. 13,908 (1994). ·
319. See 59 Fed. Reg. 13,910 (1994). Compliance with such a guideline would also avoid a
difficulty confronted by courts in FOIA cases - namely, whether the information subject to
disclosure is "reasonably segregable" from exempt information. See supra note 248.
320. See supra notes 280-82 and accompanying text (arguing for a functional test of record status that avoids the question whether materials include personal information).
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should emphasize the presumption that messages do not contain
personal information.321
CONCLUSION

Electronic mail systems offer their users the ability to communicate as much as they want whenever they want. Accordingly, when
e-mail systems were introduced into the White House, officials took
advantage of them, presumably for the entire gamut of communications that such systems allow. White House e-mail messages have
undoubtedly replaced some communications that formerly would
have taken place in memos and some communications that formerly would have occurred in face-to-face conversations. The
Watergate scandal, with its presidential tape recordings, serves as a
powerful reminder that decisions made through conversations can
have just as much of an impact on the nation's history as weighty
policy formulations committed to paper. Unless the citizenry is
willing to forgo the greater insight into government decisionmaking
that access to White House e-mail would provide, the substantive
content of White House electronic messages must be made available for public scrutiny.
Unfortunately, current law does not ensure this availability. Instead, the enforcement and oversight provisions of recordkeeping
law remained uninvoked while White House officials deleted
whatever e-mail messages they wanted whenever they wanted.322
When private citizens stepped in to halt these arbitrary recordkeeping practices, they were forced to confront many legal hurdles: issues of judicial review and standing,323 the claim that e-mail
messages presumptively fail to qualify as records,324 and the contention that current law grants White House officials the discretion to
delete any messages they want without need to consult recordkeeping guidelines.325
The Armstrong plaintiffs have negotiated these initial obstacles
but have yet to gain access to any White House electronic mail.
Moreover, courts are still investigating whether new White House
321. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 4, at 11-12, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5742-43 (stating that the scope of the phrase presidential records is very broad and that the
scope of personal records is correspondingly very narrow "since a great number of what
might ordinarily be construed as one's private activities are, because of the nature of the
presidency, considered to be of a public nature"); id. at 12, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5743 (observing that due to the public nature of the presidency, the duty to separate presidential from personal records will "involve relatively little burden because the volume of
truly personal material is considered minuscule").
322. See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
323. See supra section II.A.
324. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
325. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
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recordkeeping guidelines ensure appropriate preservation of e-mail
messages. Finally, given the current scheme's limited enforcement
mechanisms and their history of nonuse, one must wonder how further arbitrary destruction of White House information can be
prevented.
This Note has proposed three paths to pursue. First, courts
should insist that recordkeeping guidelines are formulated and enforcement duties are discharged in accordance with the needs of
history.326 Second, Congress should strengthen the law by enhancing the Archivist's participation in presidential recordkeeping and
by codifying limited judicial review.327 Third, White House officials
and the Archivist should develop recordkeeping guidelines that
mandate preservation of historically significant information regardless of the medium used to create or transmit it.328 Through these
means, White House officials will be able to use any effective
method of communication that technology can provide, yet deficient White House recordkeeping practices can be either prevented
or more quickly corr~cted, thereby ensuring a rich historical record
of modem White House decisionmaking.

326. See supra section I.D.
327. See supra section 11.B.2.
328. See supra section III.B.

